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ABSTRACT
This research was undertaken to examine the securi
ties market reaction to the quality of segmental disclo
sures required by FASB Statement Number 14.

The investi

gation updates the previous empirical studies which
examined the securities market reaction to the Securities
and Exchange Commission's Segmental disclosure rules.
Information from three hundred diversified firms
and their beta values were obtained from the Value-line
tape.

One hundred and fifty of the firms were required

to report segmental data in their annual financial reports.
They were referred to as the experimental group.

One

hundred and fifty diversified firms were not required to
report segmental data in the annual reports.

They were

referred to as the control group.
The first step was to compare the systematic risk
of the experimental group with the control group by using
parametric and non-parametric statistics.

The second

step was to evaluate the quality of segmental disclosures
in the annual financial reports of the experimental group.
Based on the disclosure quality, the sample was divided
into the high quality disclosure and the low quality dis
closure groups.

SIC code scores were calculated for each
ix
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firm of the experimental group.

A Spearman Rank Correla

tion test was conducted to determine the correlation
between the disclosure scores and the SIC code scores.
The results of this test indicated that the correlation
of the two scores was statistically significant.
Multiple Discriminant Analysis was applied to the
high quality and low quality groups, based on twelve
financial variables which are often discussed in the
literature as affecting systematic risk.

The results

indicated that the two groups were homogenous with re
spect to these financial variables.
In examining the securities market reaction to the
segmental disclosures, two major groups were identified:
(.1)

The Control Group

(.2)

The Experimental Group (subdivided into two
groups)
a.

The High Qtiality Disclosure Group.

b.

The Low Quality Disclosure Group.

The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test and the student's
t-test, were used to find differences between:
(!)

The Control Group

and the Experimental Group.

(2)

The Control Group

and the High Quality Group.

(3)

The Control Group

and the Low Quality Group.

(.4)

The High Quality Group and the Low Quality
Group.

Finally, the Analysis of Covariance test was also
conducted to find differences between the high quality
x
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disclosure group and the low quality disclosure
group.
The parametric and non-parametric tests gave essen
tially the same results:
1.

The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results indicated

that there was no significant difference between the beta
cumulative distributions of the control group and the ex
perimental group.
2.

The student's t-test results indicated that

there was no significant difference between the two
group means, but the two group variances were signifi
cantly different.
3.

Both test results indicated statistically sig

nificant differences between the control group and the
high quality group.
4.

The two. test results indicated statistically

significant differences between the control group and the
quality group.
5.

The final test examined the differences between

the high quality disclosure and the low quality disclo
sure groups.

The Kolmogorov-Smirnov, the student's

t-test and the Analysis of Covariance test were applied.
The test results indicated that the betas of the two
groups were significantly different and that their qual
ity of disclosures were also significantly different.

xi
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Based on the above results, conclusions were drawn as
follows:
1.

The quality of disclosure is statistically re

lated to the systematic risk.
2.

The results showed that the high quality dis

closure firms have lower systematic risk than either
the control group or the low quality disclosure group.
3.

Investors are uncertain about the segmental

data that are not disclosed or that are not adequate
and informative.

xii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Accounting Principles Board (APB) of the American
Institute of CPAs issued Statement Number 2, entitled
"Disclosure of Supplemental Financial Information by Di
versified Companies", in April, 1968.

The statement urged

the diversified companies to report segment information
voluntarily.

In 1969, the Securities and Exchange Commis

sion (SEC) required the registrants (publicly traded
diversified companies) to disclose sales and earnings by
line of business.
In 1969, financial, analysts, creditors, investors
and other users of financial statements urged the account
ing profession to address the issue of reporting finan
cial data for segments of a diversified company.

The

Accounting Principles Board supported this idea and re
iterated that the objectives of financial statements
should include the following:
(1)

to provide reliable financial information about
the economic resources and obligations of a
business enterprise;

(.2)

to provide relevant financial accounting infor
mation so that users could make economic

1
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2.
decisions;
and
(3)

to provide information that is understandable to
the prudent users of the information (APB State
ment Number 4, 1975).

To meet these and other objectives, financial analysts,
accountants, creditors and other financial statement users
urged the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to
issue a pronouncement on the disclosure requirements of
diversified companies.
In December, 1976, the FASB issued Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards Number 14, "Financial Re
porting of Segments of a Business Enterprise", which de
scribed industry segments, the tests of reportable seg
ments and the requirements for segmental reporting
disclosures.

An industry segment is defined by the FASB

as a "Component of an enterprise engaged in providing
a product or service or a group of related products and
services primarily to unaffiliated customers (i.e., cus
tomers outside the enterprise) for profit" (FASB Statement Number 14, paragraph 9).

1

Holzapfel

2

identified

three factors to be considered in determining industry

^AICPA Professional Standards, Financial Account
ing Standards Board, Statement Number 14, Paragraph 9.
2
Ibid.
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segments:

(a) the nature of the product,

(b) the nature of

the product process, and (c) markets and market methods.
Another factor mentioned in FASB Statement Number 14 is
that companies can treat foreign operations as segments
under some circumstances specified by the statement.
Once industry segments are determined, they must meet
one of the following tests to be considered reportable
segments:

(a)

its revenue must be ten percent or more

of the combined revenue of all the companies1 segments;
(b) the operating profit or loss must be ten percent or
more of the combined operating profit of all industry
segments that did not incur an operating loss, or the
combined operating loss of all industry segments that did
incur an operating loss; and (c) the identifiable assets
of each reportable segment must be ten percent or more
of the combined assets of all the companies' segments.
The Board stated that:
the reportable segments of an enterprise shall
represent a substantial portion of the enter
prise' s total operations.
The following test
shall be applied to determine whether a sub
stantial portion of enterprise's operations is
explained by its segment information.
The com
bined revenue from sales to unaffiliated cus
tomers of all reportable segments (that is,
revenue not including intersegment sales or
transfers) shall constitute at least 75 percent
of the combined revenue from sales to unaffili
ated customers of all industry segments. The
test shall be applied separately for each fiscal o
year for which financial statements are presented.

O
AICPA Professional Standards,

0£.

cit.
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4
Ih addition to the tests of reportable segments, FASB
Statement Number 14 requires that diversified companies
disclose the following segment information:
(1)

the revenue information of a reportable segment,

(2)

the sales or transfers to other industry seg
ments ,

(3)

the basis of accounting for intersegment sales
or transfers,

(4)

segment operating profit or loss,

(5)

expenses incurred by each reportable segment,

(.6)

the tax effects of operating income or loss,

(.7)

all identifiable assets including deprecia
tion, depletion and amortization expense,

(8)

capital expenditures,

(.9)

equity in the net assets of unconsolidated
subsidiaries and other equity method investees,

(10)

the geographic area in which the reportable
segment operates,

(11)

the foreign operation information, and

(12)

the major customers.

There are three options a company may adopt in reporting
segment information.

The first option allows a company

to include the segment information within the body of
the financial statements with appropriate explanatory
disclosures in the footnotes to the financial statements.
The second option allows a company to present segment

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

information entirely in the footnotes.

The third option

allows the information to be presented in a separate
schedule.

4

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The major purpose of the study was to examine the
reaction of the securities market to the quality of seg
mental disclosure rules of FASB Statement Number 14.
The investigation was to determine whether the quality
of segmental disclosures had any effect on investors'
decisions,

Quality of segmental disclosures as measured

in the study relates to completeness and location of the
disclosures as well as the manner of presentation, i.e.,
schedular, geographical, or narrative form.
The research was based on the assumption of the
efficient market hypothesis of the semi-strong form which
states that all publicly available information is impounded
rapidly in security prices."*

One problem addressed in

this study is whether or not the segment data is new
information, a second problem is whether the securities
market can distinguish the quality of segmental disclosure

4
AICPA Professional Standards,

0£.

cit.

^Fama, E. F . , "The Behavior of Stock Market Prices,"
Journal of Business, (January, 1955), pp. 34-105.
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6
in determining market risk.

The implications of the secu

rities market reaction to segment information must there
fore be addressed.

If the securities market distinguishes

high quality segment information from low quality segment
information, the FASB's position is affirmed and the high
quality disclosures represent models which other firms
should emulate.

If there is a market reaction to the seg

mental disclosures, but not to the quality of disclosures,
segmental data is new information the market and the FASB's
position is also affirmed but the type of disclosure is
immaterial.

If the segmental disclosures do not cause

market reactions by providing new information, the FASB's
position of requiring the segmental data may be questioned,
as the disclosures are not provided without a cost.
ANTICIPATED CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY
This study provides some evidence of the effect of
segmental disclosures (as required by the FASB Statement
Number 14) on the systematic risk associated with diver
sified firms.

While segmental disclosure is not an ab

solute determinant of the systematic risk, it may be a
factor.

Moreover, empirical research has not dealt with

the segmental disclosures based on FASB Statement Number
14.

This study is the first to measure the significance

of the segmental disclosures on the systematic risk of
the firms which have been required to report segmental
data under FASB Statement 14.
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The study updates and substantiates several of the
previous studies conducted under the SEC segmental dis
closure rules.

These previous studies indicated in

vestors do react to the SEC segmental disclosures.

Im

provements in the previous research methodologies are
included and >discussed in Chapter 3.
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The main objective of this research is to examine
the impact of segmental reporting disclosures on the
securities market.

Specifically, the objectives of the

research study are:
1.

To investigate whether the securities market

reacts to segmental reporting disclosures in assessing
the systematic risk of the diversified companies.
2.

To update the previous studies on segmental re

porting disclosures.

For example, Kochanek^ used 1966,

1967, 1968 and 1969 data.

Singhvi and Desai^ used 1965
O

and 1966 data.

Horwitz and Kolcdny

used 1969 data.

Kochanek, R, , "Segmental Financial Disclosures
and Security Prices," The Accounting Review, (April,
1974), pp. 254-258.
^Singhvi, Surendra and Harsha B. Desai, "An
Empirical Analysis of the Quality of Corporate Financial
Disclosure," The Accounting Review, (January, 1971),
pp. 129-138.
o
Horwitz, Bertrand and Richard Kolodny, "Line of
Business Reporting and Security P rices: An Analysis of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Simonds and Collins

used 1967-1970 data.

These previous

studies did not look into the effect of FASB's Statement
14 issued in December, 1976 on segmental disclosure re
quirements.

They investigated the effect of SEC segmental

disclosure requirements by using SEC 10-K reports.

Since

the investing public (investors, financial arialysts,
creditors) often turn to the annual financial reports for
information, a testable hypothesis is whether the impact
of segmental disclosures in annual financial reports on
the securities market will be significant.
SCOPE OF THE STUDY
To accomplish the purposes of this investigation,
primary attention was given to the following areas:
1.

The objectives and requirements of segmental

reporting, based on FASB Statement Number 14.
2.

The accounting variables that affect syste

matic risk in addition to quality of segmental disclo
sures.
3.

The relationship between systematic risk and

segmental disclosures.

an SEC Disclosure Rule," The Bell Journal of Economics,
Volume 8, Number 1, (Spring, 1977), pp. 235^249.
q
Simonds, Richard R. and Daniel W. Collins, "Line
of Business Reporting and Security Prices: An Analysis
of an SEC Disclosure Rule:
Comment," The Bell Journal
of Economics, Volume 9, (Autumn, 1978), pp. 646-658.
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4.

Evaluation of the quality of segmental dis

closures in annual reports based on FASB Statement Number
14 using an appropriate evaluation tool.
5.

The use of statistical tools to examine risk

associated with the firms and the quality of their dis
closures .
PREVIEW OF THE PLAN OF INQUIRY
The investigation addresses systematic risk (market
beta of firms) and the quality of segmental disclosures
as enunciated by FASB Statement Number 14.
inquiry takes the following pattern:

The plan of

Chapter one con

sists of the introduction, statement of the problem, the
anticipated contributions of the study, the objectives
of the study, the scope of the study, and the preview of
the plan of inquiry.

Chapter two reviews the literature

related to the efficient market hypothesis and its rela
tionship to the financial statement data.

Also, evidence

on segmental information based on empirical research is
further discussed in this chapter.
sists of the methodology.

Chapter three con

Different statistical tools

are used to examine the differences between the experi
mental and the control samples.

The evaluation of

annual reports and classification of the experimental
group as the high-quality and the low-quality disclosure
groups are discussed.

In Chapter four the results and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1C

analysis of findings are discussed.

Chapter five con-

consists of the summary, the conclusions, the limitations
and the recommendations for further research.

The next

chapters present a review of the literature and relates
the previous studies to the problem investigated.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter 2
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH
The Effficient Market Hypot "sis and Financial Statement
Data
The reaction of the securities market to the finan
cial statement data has been empirically investigated by
1
many researchers,
Fama defines capital market efficiency
as one in which market prices fully reflect all informa
tion at that time.

Fama's work serves as a major fotinda-i

tion of much of the market related research.
Ball and
2
Brown examined the capital market reaction to tirms with
positive earnings changes as compared to firms with nega
tive earnings changes.

They concluded that the securi3

ties market reacts to the annual income report.

Beaver

studied the price and trading volume reaction to annual
financial statement announcements, and his results sub
stantially supported the Ball and Brown study.

1
Fama, E. F. , "The Behavior of Stock Market Prices,"
Journal of Business, (January, 1955), pp. 34-105.
O

Ball, R. and Brown, P., "An Empirical Evaluation
of Accounting Income Numbers." Journal of Accounting
Research, (Autumn, 1968), pp. 159-178.
3
Beaver, W. H. , "The Information Content of Annual
Earnings Announcements." Empirical Research in

11
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In addition, Chatlos^, Dyckman et. al."*, Foster^, Beaver^,
8
9
^-0
11
Foster , Taylor , Patell
, and Spangler
have provided
support that the capital market react to publicly avail
able information such as the annual financial reports.

Accounting:
Selected Studies, 1968.
Supplement to Journal
of Accounting Research, (1968), pp. 67-92.
^Chatlos, R. J. , "Inside Information and the Analyst."
In S. N. Levine (ed.) Financial Analyst1s Handbook
1-Portfolio Management, Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, 1976,
pp. 74-86.
^Dyckman, Thomas, David H. Downes and Robert P.
Magee, Efficient Capital Market and Accounting: A Critical
Analysis:Prentice-Hall, Incorporated, Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey, 1975, pp. 5-7.
fi

Foster, George, Financial Statement Analysis,
Prentice-Hall, Incorporated, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey,
1978.
^Beaver, W. H. , "What Should be the FASB's Objective?"
The Journal of Ac cotintancy, (August, 1973), pp. 49-56.
g

Foster, George, "Quarterly Accounting Data: TimeSeries Properties and Predictive Ability Results," The
Accounting Review, (January, 1977), pp. 1-21.
9
Taylor, R. G . , "An Examination of the Evolution
Content; Utility and Problems of Published Interim Re
ports," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
Chicago, 1963.
■^Patell, J. M. , "Corporate Forecasts of Earnings per
Share and Stock Price Behavior: Empirical Tests," Journal
of Accounting Research, (Autumn, 1976), pp. 246-276.
^Spangler, C. W. , "The Effects of Unanticipated
Changes in Dividends on Security Returns," Unpublished
Master of Science Thesis, M.I.T., Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1973.
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The present investigation is based on the assumption of
the semi-strong form of the efficient market, which
states that the securities market reacts to publicly
available financial statement data, which beginning in
December, 1976 includes information as required by FASB
Statement Number 14.

The previous research supports the

use of the efficient market assumption.

That is, if seg

mental information is new data to the securities market,
then the securities market provides a mechanism whereby
the reaction to segmental disclosures can be evaluated.
Of more importance to this proposition is whether the
quality of disclosures play a vital role in the assess
ment of systematic risk.

These two propositions have

been tested.
The Evidence of the previous research on the seg
mental information of the Securities and Exchange Commssion is discussed helow.
The Kinney Study
Kinney

1)

investigated the relative predictive ability

of segment versus consolidated data in estimating future
total-entity earnings of diversified companies.

Kinney

^Kinney, W. R. , Jr., "Predicting Earnings:
Entity
versus Subentity Data," Journal of Accounting Research,
(Spring, 1971), pp. 127-136.
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analyzed twenty-six firms that disclosed segment revenue
and profit data in their annual reports for 1968 and 1969.
By using four expectation models, he found that segmentbased predictions of 1968 and 1969 consolidated earnings
had significantly smaller average absolute prediction
errors than did predictions based on historical consoli
dated earnings figures.

Kinney cautioned against gener

alization of the results, since there could be other rea
sons which made the diversified firms disclose their
segmental data voluntarily and since the segmental report
ing disclosures were not required at the time of his study.
The Collins Study
13
Collins
extended and updated the preliminary work
of Kinney.

Collins used data disclosed under the line-of-

business reporting requirements of the SEC imposed in
1970.

He identified ninety-six firms which provided seg

ment revenue and profit data from 1967 through 1970 from
1970 Form 10-K reports.,

By using several times series

m o d e l s ^ Collins found that segmental-based procedures

13

Collins, Daniel W . , "Predicting Earnings with
Subentity Data:
Some Further Evidence," Journal of
Accounting Research, (Spring, 1976), pp. 163-177.
^ F o r further discussion of the time series models
used by Collins, see Journal of Accounting Research,
Volume 14, (Spring, 1976), pp. 163-177.
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appeared to out perform the consolidated-based methods in
predicting levels of eamirigs.
with Kinney's earlier findings.

This result is consistent
Collins concluded that:

The predictive ability results presented in this
study generally corroborate Kinney's earlier
findings which were based on segment data volun
tarily disclosed in the published annual reports.
The evidence suggests the SEC product-line revenue
and profit disclosures together with industry
sales projections published in various government
sources provide significantly more accurate esti
mates of future total-entity sales and earnings
than those procedures that rely totally on con
solidated data (p. 175).
The Singhvi and Desai Study
15
Singhvi and Desai
investigated the quality of cor
porate financial statement disclosures and related the
quality to other characteristics of the firms.

They ran

domly selected 100 listed companies and 55 unlisted cor
porations for fiscal years ending between April, 1965,
and March 31, 1966, from the 500 largest U.S. industrial
corporations included in the Fortune's 500 Directory of
1965.

They used a systematic sampling procedure to

select the annual reports of unlisted corporations from
the National Over-the-Counter quotations of the 800
corporations published in the New York Times.
Singhvi and Desai evaluated the quality of corporate
disclosures in the annual reports (between April, 1965

ISSinghvi

and Desai, o£. cit.
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and March 31, 1966) by using an index of disclosure with
16
thirty-four items.
The items were taken from Cerf
who
selected the items in the index on the basis of a study
of the investment decision process, a review of the
literature, interviews with security analysts, and an
examination of analysts' reports.

Weights were assigned

to the items in order to note differences in their rela
tive importance.

The total weights given to all items

equaled sixty-eight.
The quality of disclosure in annual reports was
quantified by assigning disclosure scores for each item.
The corporations were classified according to the total
disclosure scores.

A multivariate analysis was used to

test the significance of the relationship between the
quality of disclosure and various characteristics.

It

is important to note that Singhvi and Desai made the
assumption that the quality of disclosure in annual re
ports is not by itself an independent variable; it is
very likely to be influenced by several variables.
Their study focused on investigating a relationship
between quality disclosure and asset size, number of

16

Cerf, Alan R . , "Corporate Reporting and Investment
Decisions," The University of California Press, 1961,
pp. 25-27.
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stockholders, listing status, CPA firms, rate of return,
and earnings margin.

Singhvi and Desai concluded that:

Corporations which disclose inadequate informa
tion are likely to be:
(a) small in size as
measured by total assets, (b) small in size as
measured by number of stockholders, (c) free
from listing requirements, (d) audited by a
small CPA firm, (e) less profitable as measured
by rate of return, and (f) less profitable as
measured by earnings margin.
They also concluded that:
Inadequate corporate disclosure in annual reports
is likely to widen fluctuations in the market
price of a security since investment decisions,
in the absence of adequate information, are based
on less objective measures (p. 137).
The significance of the Singhvi and Desai study is
that the quality of corporate disclosures could be evalu
ated, and that quality related to financial and market
characteristics of the firm could be measured.

A second

major point is that the variables they related to the
quality of disclosure must be held constant if differ
ences in disclosure quality are to be studied.

There

fore, in studying the market effect of difference in
the quality of segmental disclosures, the effect of ex
traneous variables must be held constant.
The Kochanek Study
Kochanek ^ investigated the securities market r e 
actions for diversified firms which have adopted

1 ^Kochanek, oj>. cit.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

18

alternative segmental financial disclosure practices.

He

selected thirty-seven diversified December 31 fiscal
year firms.

The annual financial reports of the firms

were obtained and surveyed for the years 1966, 1967, 1968
and 1969.

A review of the literature by Kochanek re

vealed the types of segmental disclosures that were gen
erally agreed upon by past researchers as useful to the
investors and financial analysts.

Kochanek divided the

types of segmental disclosures into four levels:
(1)

descriptive,

(.2) segment sales,

(4) segment assets.

(3) segment income,

He assigned an approximately equal

number of possible points to each level so as not to
give disproportionate consideration to a particular item
of disclosure.

Kochanek did not make any judgment as

to whether or not segment earnings data, for instance,
were proportionately more or less useful to investors
than segment sales.

Instead, the desirability of the

presence of segmental data was measured in three degrees:
none, partial, and satisfactory.

A matrix description

of the segmental reporting characteristics is presented
in Table 2.1.
According to the results of the survey conducted
by Kochanek, twenty-four firms out of thirty-seven
firms disclosed at least the minimum desired amount of
subentity detail consisting of complete segment de
scriptions and corresponding gross revenues.

These

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

19

TABLE 2.1
Degree of Segmental Disclosure

Type of
Segmental Disclosure

None

Partial

Satis
factory

Maximum
Weights

Level 1, Description:
1.

List of Segments

0

1

2

2

2.

Segment Description

0

1

2

2

3.

Segment Companies

0

1

2

2

4.

Segment Products

0

1

2

2

5.

Future Segment
Plans

0

1

2

2

New Acquisitions

0

2

2

6.

n
Level 2, Segment Sales:
Tabular ($)

0

4

10

Chart of Graph

0

2

8

Correspond with
Segment Descrip
tion

0

1

10
-

2

2

TZ

Level 3, Segment Income:
Tabular ($)

0

4

Basis for Income
Computation

0

-

10

10
2

2
U

Level 4, Segment Assets:
Segment Capital
Expenditures

0

2

5

Segment Assets

0

2

5

5
5
TU

Continued on next page.
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TABLE 2.1 continued
Degree of Segmental Disclosure
Assigned Weights
Type of
Segmental Disclosure

None

Partial

Satisfactory

Maximum
Weights

Comparison of Data:
(Sales & Income)
0

1

years

0

2

6 years or longer

0

3

1 year
2 - 5

3

Maximum possible 1 year
score

49

Maximum possible 4 year
score (49X4)

196

Source:

Kochanek, R.
"Segmental Financial Disclosure and
Security Prices," The Accounting Review,
(April, 1974), p. 249.
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twenty-four firms qualified as good reporters.

Based on

the results of his study, a score of 94 was the minimum cut
off point for good reporters.

The survey scores ranged

from a low of 20 to a high of 181, out of a possible 196
points.

Six firms out of twenty-four good reporters were

classified as superior reporters.
firms ranged from 166 to 181.
fied as "poor" reporters.

The scores for these

Thirteen firms were classi

The scores of these firms

ranged from 20 to 80.
The author presented four models to evaluate the rela
tionship between segmental financial disclosure and earn
ings predictability.

The four models were referred to as

long term, January 1, 1969 to January 1, 1970; intermedi
ate, January 1, 1970 to June, 1970; short term,'Jdly 1,
1970 to January 1, 1971; and current, January 1, 1971 to
April, 1971.

Kochanek stated that:

The purpose of these models was to deter
mine if firms disclosing subentity data
had greater earnings predictability than
firms not revealing such information.
Earnings predictability was measured by
correlations between changes in annual
reported earnings per share figures and
changes in stock prices computed over
time periods which preceded (led), and
succeeded (lagged) the earnings change
observation year (p. 251).
The Kochanek study is significant in that he provided a
mechanism for measuring the quality of segmental dis
closures which has been modified and employed in this
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study.

His results suggest that there is a market re

sponse to the quality of segmental disclosures.

By pro

viding more control of extraneous variables, the market
reaction to the quality of segmental disclosures may be
more clearly identified.

The Kochanek study provides a

major basis for the study reported in later chapters.
Kochanek's results suggest that segmental disclosure re
sults aid investors in anticipating future earnings
changes in the valuation of securities.

The stock market

reactions to current earnings announcements would be
stronger for poor reporters than for good reporters.

Also,

his results indicated that in the absence of segmental
information, the investors reacted more to current infor
mation sources, such as new releases and quarterly
earnings announcements.

In conclusion, the hypothesis

that sample firms with good segmental disclosure would
exhibit the same distribution of computed weekly stock
price variability ratios as firms with poor segmental
disclosure was rejected.

Kochanek cautioned against

possible bias because he did not control extraneous
variables which may have affected his results.
The Beston Study
Contrary to the studies discussed above, Beston

18

examined the effect of the disclosure requirements of
1ft

ket:

Beston, G. , "Required Disclosure and the Stock Mar
An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of
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the SEC Act of 1934.

He examined the effects of the r e 

quired disclosure of sales, since analysts considered sales
very important.

By using a r i s k - r e t u m linear model, he

concluded that there was no measurable effect between the
residuals of the companies that did or did not disclose
their sales.

He further stated that disclosure of sales

figures would not add any information to the financial
statements once profit is known.
The Horwitz and Kolodny Study
19
A study made by Horwitz and Kolodny

examined the im

pact of line-of-business reporting required by the SEC
in 1970, on the securities market.

By using the capital

asset pricing model, Horwitz and Kolodny selected two
samples - one experimental group (the line-of-business
reporting sample) called LOBUR sample, and the control
group (the non-line-of-business reporting sample) called
non-LOBUR.

One hundred firms were randomly selected.

Fifty LOBUR firms which provided segmental data in their
1969 annual reports were selected from 1969 edition of
Accounting Trends and Techniques.

The fifty non-LOBUR

firms were selected from the SEC reports.

Data on the

two samples were taken from the COMPUSTAT Price

1934," The American Economic Review, Volume 63, Number 1,
(March, “ If 7 3), pp. 132-155.
19

Howritz and Kolodny, o£. cit.
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Dividends Earnings file.

A time period of nine years was

divided into three subperiods:
(1)

1965-1970 period - this is the period before
the change in the reporting requirement (pre
disclosure period);

(.2)

1971 period - the one-year period surrounding
the time in which the change in the reporting
requirement took effect (disclosure period), and

(.3)

1972-1973 period - two-year period, following
the change in the reporting requirement (post
disclosure),
A

By using the market model, R ± t

A

+

*

+ Pi Rmt + ^Pit»

Horwitz and Kolodny evaluated whether shifts in per
ceived market risk as measured by beta during the dis
closure period were significantly greater for LOBUR
firms than for non-LOBUR firms.

By estimating the

average absolute beta for the three periods indicated,
they concluded that shifts in market risk around the
time of disclosure were no greater for LOBUR firms than
for non-LOBUR firms.

The authors further concluded that

shifts in market risk provide no evidence that LOBUR
information affected the level of market risk perceived
by the investors.
The authors further measured the unexpected returns
that were realized on the securities of the LOBUR fifms
close to the time that the additional information was
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disclosed.

Specifically, the issue was whether the newly

discovered line-of-business data ldd to a reassessment of
value of reporting firms by investors.

The results of

the residual analysis provided no evidence that LOBUR re
porting affected security prices.
Even though the Horwitz and Kolodny study suggested
that there was no market reaction to segmental data as
required by the SEC, an investigation of the market effect
of the FASB's segmental disclosures is still warranted.
The FASB's disclosure requirements are more extensive
than the SEC's requirements which Horwitz and Kolodny
studied.

The Simonds and Collins Study
Simonds and Collins

20

also investigated the risk-

information effects of LOBUR disclosure.
divided into two parts.

Their study was

The first part replicated the

Horwitz and Kolodny study; the second part examined the
movement of BETA Coefficients from April, 1968 to
December, 1974.

Simonds and Collins identified LOBUR

firms as those having segmental disclosures in annual
reports registration statements, or proxy statements
issued prior to filing of their 1970 10-K reports with
the SEC.

The types of segmental disclosure by indivi

dual firms in their 1967-1970 annual reports were

Simonds and Collins, oj>. cit.
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obtained from Accounting Trends and Techniques.

The monthly

return data on the CRSP tapes for the time period of Octo
ber, 1965 through July, 1974 were obtained for 215 firms.
These firms were classified into three groups.

The first

group was called Multisegment Treatment Group (MST).
consisted of 78 firms.

It

The MST group provided the most

extensive segmental disclosures.

The second group, Multi

segment Control Group (MCG) consisted of 70 firms.

Those

firms that had no or limited segmental disclosure (seg
ment revenue disclosure only) in the annual reports,
prospectus, or proxy statements in the period 1967-1970
prior to initiation of SEC LOBUR in the 1970 10-K.

The

third group was called the Single-Segment Control Group
(SSC) which consisted of 67 firms.

The characteristic

of this group was that the firms did not have segmental
disclosure either before or after initiation of SEC
LOBUR in the 1970 10-K.

The firms in each group were

identified by three-digit Standard Industrial Classifi
cation Codes (SIC).
The focus of this study was to compare relative
changes in beta (from pre-LOBUR to post-LOBUR) for treat
ment versus control groups.

By using the market model,

Simonds and Collins calculated moving-beta estimates (Bir )
for each of the three groups.

The results of the tests

indicated a significant downward drift in the beta level
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of the multi-segment treatment group with the most dra
matic shift occurring within the designated critical peri
od, which is eight months after the initiation of the
SEC LOBUR reporting for registration statements and twelve
months before the initial disclosure of LOBUR data in the
1970 10-K reports.

On the other hand, the average betas

of the multi-segment and single-segment control groups
indicated considerable stability overall with little
change within the designated critical period.
The authors investigated the observed beta changes
for each of the three groups by using the analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA) procedure.

The results of the ANCOVA

tests strongly confirmed the previous result that the
multi-segment treatment group portfolio (MST) experienced
a significant shift in beta while the Multi-segment con
trol group (MSC) and single-segment control group (SSC)
indicated no significant beta change during the desig
nated critical period.
The authors concluded that:
A
The fact that the beta change lor the MST
portfolio appears to have occurred before
March, 1971, suggest that SEC LOBUR data
were being developed and disseminated to
the market well in advance of the-time
that such data were published as part of
21
the registrant's 1970 10-K reports (p. 653).

21
Ibid.
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Using the Horwitz and Kolodny procedures and comparing MST
and MSC or MST and SSC, the authors did not reject the null
hypothesis of no difference between the treatment group
and the control group.

Neither was it rejected when they

used the standard F-test for equality of variances.

How

ever, the authors pointed out that if the t-tests were
conducted using the raw beta changes, significant test
statistics would have been obtained.
Generally the above studies, with the exception of
Horwitz and Kolodny, support the assumption that the
securities market reacts to segmental disclosure re
quired by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) .
Also, research shows that sub-entity financial statements
are better predictors of future earnings than the consoli
dated earnings.

The majority of the above studies em

pirically support the proposition ^nat segmental dis
closures are important to investors and provide a founda
tion for this study.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PREVIOUS STUDIES TO THE PRESENT
STUDY
As mentioned above, the variables mentioned by
22
Singhvi and Desai
were used in this study as the

22
Singhvi and Desai, o£. cit.
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discriminating variables among others to examine the dif
ferences between the quality of disclosures based on the
23
24
firms' financial attributes.
Samples in the Kochanek
study lacked homogeneity.

He did not control or attempt

to extract the extraneous variables in order to achieve
25
homogeneity of the sample. Also, Horwitz and Kolodny,
26
Beston
studies did not have a control group or did not
attempt to control for extraneous variables. Simonds and
27
Collins
study is superior to the others in that they
included treatment and the control groups, although con
trol and treatment groups were not sufficient to suppres
the influence of extraneous variables.

Other procedures

can be used to further remove effects of extraneous
variables.
One of the main motivations of this investigation
was to use different statistical tools to control or
eliminate extraneous or confounding variables that may
make the results or findings of any empirical research
J

suspect.

The first step in controlling for the

23
A detailed discussion on the financial attri
butes can be found on page 57.
24
^
,
Kochanek, op. cit.
25

Horwitz and Kolodny, o£. cit,

^Beston, o£. ci t .
^Simonds and Collins, oj>. cit.
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extraneous variable was to carefully select the experi
mental sample firms.

The major point of investigation

is that if any difference in systematic risk does occur
because of the quality of segmental disclosure, it
should be the effect of differences in segmental dis
closure.

Measures of control were imposed on the experi

mental group by examining whether the firms in the group
were homogenous across attributes other than segmental
disclosures.

The previous studies discussed above did

not use the measures employed in this study to control
for the extraneous variables.

The next chapter discus

ses in detail the methodology used in this study and
the measures employed to control extraneous effects.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes the research methodology em
ployed in the study.

The first section discusses the

research sample and its characteristics.

The second

section presents the significance of the systematic risk
and its relationship to accounting variables.

The third

section discusses the statistical methods employed in
this study.
design.

The fourth section presents the evaluation

The final section discusses the methodology

used to extract extraneous variables.
The Research Sample
Three hundred diversified companies were selected
from the Value-Line tape and Investment Survey Records
of 1978.

The companies selected had the following

characteristics:
(1)

total assets must be equal to or greater
than $500 million,

(2)

the rates of return (Net Earnings/Total In
vestment) must be five percent and above, and

(3)

the earnings margin must be three percent or
more.

31
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These criteria represent one method used to achieve homo
geneity among the diversified firms so as to control the
effect of these variables on the systematic risk.
One hundred and fifty diversified companies of the
three hundred firms reported segmental data in their 1978
annual reports as required by the FASB Statement Number
14.

They represent the experimental group.

The remain

ing one hundred and fifty firms reported only consolidated
statements in their 1978 annual reports.

These firms did

not meet the FASB Statement: Number 14 requirements in
1978 and as such were not required to report segmental
disclosures.

The one hundred and fifty non-segmental

reporting firms comprise the control group (See Appendix
C).
The main purpose of having a control group is to
find the difference in the systematic risk of the diver
sified firms that reported segmental data and those
diversified firms that were not required to report seg
mental data.

A priori reasoning would suggest that the

more information a firm disseminates about the operating
performances of its segments, the lower will be the sys
tematic risk of the firm, all other factors being equal.
Kinney'*’ indirectly supported this hypothesis by reporting
that segment-based predictions of consolidated earnings

1
Kinney, W. R . , o£. cit.
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had significantly smaller average absolute prediction
errors than did predictions based on historical consoli
dated earnings figures.

Other evidence that supported
2
this assertion was provided by Collins.
He found that
segmental-based procedures appeared to dominate the
consolidated-based procedures in predicting levels of

earnings.
O
Simonds and Collins

empirically assessed the risk-

information effects of Line-of-Business disclosures by
testing three groups:

Multisegment Treatment Group,

Multisegment Control Group and Single-Segment Control
Group.

The authors compared relative changes in beta

(from pre-LOBUR to post-LOBUR) for treatment versus con
trol groups.

The results of their tests indicated a

significant downward drift in the beta level of the
Multisegment Treatment Group with the most dramatic
shift occurring within the designated critical period the disclosure period.

^Collins, D. W. , o]3. cit.
3

For further study on Simonds and Collins, see
Chapter 2.
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SYSTEMATIC RISK (MARKET BETA)
The measure of systematic risk used in the study is
the systematic risk (the market beta) from the traditional market model, Rit

+ J-jRmt + J^it-

turn on security i in period t.
market portfolio in period t.

^it i-s the re"

is the return on the
The market betas for therthree

hundred companies-were taken from the Value Line tapes.
By definition, market beta is expressed as follows:

C o v (R i ’V

f m= ....... ................ (1)
Var(Rm)
Where p 111is the systematic risk.

Cov(R^,Rm ) is the

covariance of the individual return of a firm in time
t and the market return in time t; Var(Rm ) is the vari
ance of the market return in time t.
4
The Value Line betas are derived from a leastsquares regression analysis between weekly percent
changes in the price of stock and weekly percent changes

^Value-Line User's Manual, 1978 Edition, Chapter 7,
page 18,
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in the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index over a
5
period of five years.
The betas in the Value Line base are adjusted for
non-stationarity.

Since high beta stocks may decrease

over time, and low beta stocks may increase over time,
the adjustment for nonstationarity of the calculated
market betas is important.

The adjustment for nonsta

tionarity of beta is necessary so that changes in beta
that are investigated are due to real economic events
and not to general upward or downward trends in the beta
itself.

Since the investor is interested in the ex

pected risk of his portfolio over a time period, it is
important to examine the stability of beta over time.
g
Sharpe and Cooper examined this issue by estimat
ing the betas of securities for each year from 1931 to
1969,

The data were collected from the CRSP file.

The

betas in each year were ranked from highest to lowest
and placed in ten risk- r e t u m classes.

The first risk-

r e t u m class comprised those securities with the high
est estimated betas over the past 60 months.
cedure was repeated each year.

This pro

The authors then com

puted the percentage of stocks remaining in the same

5
The Five-year period is from 1973 to 1978.
(L

Sharpe, W. F . , and Cooper, G. M. , "Risk-Retum
Classes of New York Stock Exchange Common Stocks, 1931
to 1969,” Financial Analysts Journal, (March-April, 1972),
pp. 46-54.
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r i s k - r e t u m class in adjacent one-year and five-year
periods.

If the relative rankings of betas were stable

over time, each firm would remain in the same riskr e t u m class.

They found that there is more instability

in adjacent five-year rankings of beta than in adjacent
one-year periods.

The results obtained suggest that at

the individual security level, there is nontrivial in
stability in estimated betas over time.

Beaver et. al.^

also concluded that there is considerably more stability
in the estimated betas of portfolios over time.

They

reported that the Spearman Rank Corporation between a d 
jacent betas of 307 NYSE stocks for the 1947-1956 and
1957-1965 periods were .626 at the individual security
level,

.875 at the 5-security portfolio level, and .989

at the 20-security portfolio level.
8
Beaver and Manegold examined the association b e 
tween market-determined and accounting-determined risk
measures.

They estimated the security market beta for

Beaver, et. al., "The Association Between Market
Determined and Accounting Determined Risk Measures."
The Accounting Review, (October, 1970), p. 669.
g

Beaver, W. H. , and Manegold, J., "The Association
Between Market Determined and Accounting Determined
Measures of Systematic Risk:
Some Further Evidence."
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, (June,
1975) ', ppT 231- 785".----------- --------------------------------------
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254 firms from the monthly returns over the 1951-1969
period.

The Spearman Rank Correlations for the net in

come/total assets and net income/net worth were separately
examined.

The Spearman Rank Correlations between the

securities market beta and each of the accounting vari
ables are presented in Table 3.1.
TABLE 3.1
The Relationship Between the Securities
Market Beta and the Accounting Variables

Single
security
level

Fivesecurity
level

Ten-security
portfolio
level

Net Income
Total Assets

.41

.60

.69

Net Income
Net Worth

.46

.69

.74

The authors concluded that there is a strong significant
association between the securi-j.es market and the account9
ing based estimates of beta.
The Ball and Brown study
supported the above results.

Ball and Brown used the

Spearman Rank Correlation to find a relationship between

Ball and Brown, o p . cit.
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securities market beta and operating income, net income
and net income available for common stocks, respectively.
The results indicated a significant correlation between
securities market and accounting-based estimates of beta.
In summary, previous research has demonstrated a
significant empirical relationship between a firm's
systematic risk and certain accounting variables discussed
on the previous page.

Based on previous research, investi

gating the relationship of the systematic risk with ac
counting information (i.e. disclosure of segment data)
is appropriate.
Since the three hundred diversified firms were di
vided into an experimental group with segmental dis
closures and a control group without segmental disclosures,
the first problem investigated was the difference in
systematic risk between the two groups.

That is, does

the disclosure of segmental information itself affect
systematic risk?
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test was con
ducted to test the difference between the cumulative dis
tributions of the betas of the experimental and the con
trol groups.

Also, a t-test statistic was conducted to

examine the differences between the mean betas of the
two samples.
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THE RESEARCH DESIGN
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Two-Sample Test
The main focus of this section is to examine the re
lationship between the experimental and the control
groups.

To conduct this test, the non-parametric Kolmo-

gorov-Smimov two-sample test was used to test the null
hypothesis that two independent samples were drawn from
the same population or from a population with the same
distribution.

A two-tail test was used to test the sensi

tivity of the difference in the distributions from which
the two samples were drawn (i.e., differences in location,
central tendency, in dispersion, or in skewness).

If

the two samples have been drawn from the same population,
the cumulative distributions of both samples are ex
pected to be close to each other because both samples
will be showing only random deviations from the popula
tion distribution.

If the two-sample cumulative distri

butions are significantly different at any point, the
two samples come from different populations.

Thus,

significant deviation between the two-sample cumulative

10
distributions will reject the null hypothesis.

Seigel, Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavi
oral Sciences, McGraw-Hill in Psychology, New York,
Toronto, London, 1956.
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Testing Procedures
To apply this test, a cumulative frequency distribu
tion for each sample of observations (control and experi
mental) was made by using the same intervals for both
distributions.

For each interval, one step was subtracted

from the other, the result is the deviation, which is
called " D " .

The test focused on the largest of these

observed deviations (D's).

For example, D = Maximum

Sn i(X). Sn 2 (x ) ^ where D is the deviation in each obser
vation, Sn ^(X) is the observed cumulative step function
of group one, and S ^ C x )

is the observed cumulative step

function of group two.
The systematic risk is the observed variable.

The

interval between the lowest and the highest risk measure
of market beta for the experimental and the control
groups was 0.55 and 1.80.

The two-sample beta intervals

were divided into six intervals:
(2) 0.87 to 0.97,

(1)

(3) 0.98 to 1.18,

0.55 to 0.86,

(4) 1.19 to 1.39,

(.5) 1.40 to 1.60, and (6) 0.61 to 1.80.

The blocking is

based on the frequency of distributions in both samples
so as to have a representative number of subjects in
each cell.

n ibid.
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Student's t-test
In addition to the non-parametrie test mentioned on
the previous page, a student's t-test was conducted in
calculating the probability associated with the null
hypothesis that the experimental group has the same beta
mean as the control group.

The t-test is a statistic

generally applicable to a normally distributed random
variable where the mean is assumed to be known and the
population variance is estimated from a sample.

The

t-test provides the probability levels for testing the
significance of the difference between two-sample means.
The investigator has not made any assumption as to
the normality of the sample distribution in this study;
but it is appropriate to test for the difference in the
means of the two groups by using a parametric statistic
so as to compare the results obtained with those of the
non-parametric statistics discussed earlier.

The re

sults of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the t-test for
the experimental and the control groups are discussed in
Chapter 4.
EVALUATION OF ANNUAL REPORTS DESIGN
Since the primary purpose of the study was to examine
whether or not the securities market reacts to the
quality of segmental disclosures of diversified firms, a
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sixteen-item evaluation design was used to evaluate the
quality of segmental disclosures in the 1978 annual finan
cial reports of the experimental sample.

The sixteen

items incorporate the SEC's segmental disclosure rule,
and more importantly, the segmental disclosure require
ments of FASB Statement Number 14.

The items indicate

the opinions of financial analysts and the items analysts
would like to be disclosed in the annual financial re12
ports.
A review of the literature and the substance of
the FASB Statement Number 14, revealed the type of seg
mental disclosures that have been discussed by past
researchers as useful to investors and financial ana
lysts.

The types of segmental disclosures were divided

into four categories:
(1)

general description of segmental units:

(2)

segment sales and expenses;

(.3)

segment income (losses) and the tax effect
on income (losses); and

(4)

segment assets.

Points were assigned to the items in each category based

12

Bradish, Richard D . , "Corporate Reporting and the
Financial Analysts," The Accounting Review, (October,
1965), pp. 757-765.
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on their importance to investors, i.e., high quality,
medium quality, and low quality.
Each item in category one carries equal p o i n t s .

The

high quality point is 3, the medium quality point is 2,
and the low quality point is 1.

In categories two, three

and four, each item carries different points.

The points

assigned to each item depend on the relative importance
of the item to the investors.
are from 4 to 10.
to

The high quality points

The medium quality points are from 2

8.

The low quality points are from 1 to 4. Kochanek^
14
and Singhvi and Desai
used a similar methodology.
The
matrix description of the segmental disclosure categories
is presented in Table 3.2.

13

Kochanek, oj). c it.

^Singhvi and Desai, o£. cit.
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TABLE 3.2
Degree of Segmental Disclosure
WEIGHTS
TYPE OF
Se g m e n t a l d i s c l o s u r e s

high

medium

low

MAXIMUM
He i g h t s

CATEGORY 1.
GENERAL DESCRIPTION
List of unaffili
ated customers

3

2

1

3

List of segment
companies

3

2

1

3

List of geographic
areas

3

2

1

3

(4)

Segment products

3

2

1

3

(5)

Type of industries
in the multisegment

3

2

1

3

Segment information
presented in per
centages

3

2

1

3
18

10

8

4

10

In chart or graph,
3 y r s ., 2 y r s .,
1 yr.

8

6

2

8

In notes to finan
cial statements

4

2

1

(1)
(2)
(3)

(.6)

CATEGORY 2,
SEGMENT SALES AND EXPENSES
(7)

(8)

(.9)

In tabular form,
3 y r s . , 2 yr s . ,
1 yr.

4
22

Continued on next page
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TABLE 3.2 continued
Degree of Segmental Disclosure
-WEIGHTS
TYPE OF
SEGMENTAL DISCLOSURES

HIGH

MEDIUM

LOW

'MAXIMUM
WEIGHTS

CATEGORY 3,
SEGMENT INCOME (LOSS)
AND TAX EFFECT
(10)

In tabular form

10

8

4

10

(11)

In chart or graph

8

6

2

8

(12)

In notes to finan
cial statements

4

2

1

10

8

4

10

Capital expendi
tures for 3 yrs.,
2 y r s ., 1 y r .

8

6

2

8

Liabilities for
3 y r s ., 2 y r s .,
1 yr.

6

3

2

6

4

3

1

_4

4

2T

CATEGORY 4,
SEGMENT ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES
(13)

Assets presented
for 3 y r s ., 2 y r s .,

1 6r.
(14)

(15)

(.16)

Foreign operations
for 3 y r s ., 2 y r s .,

1 yr,

28

TOTAL MAXIMUM POSSIBLE SCORE
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In this study, a high quality score of 90 is the
maximum points a firm could obtain on all the items in
the evaluation design.

For example, a score of 61 indi

cates a partial disclosure of the items listed in the
evaluation design, but not presented as fully as those
firms with higher scores.

A score of 29 indicates that

the firm partially disclosed segmental data but the dis
closure is not sufficient to provide a basis for meaning
ful interpretations about the operative performance of
each segment in the diversified firm,
A disclosure score was calculated by dividing the
points earned by an individual firm by the maximum points
available.

The maximum score a firm could obtain is one

hundred percent.

For example, if a firm obtains a score

of 72 out of the maximum score of 90, the firm obtains
an 80% (72/90) score.

This calculation was used for all

the firms in the experimental sample.
centage score was 96%.
327o.

The highest per

The lowest percentage score was

The sample was divided into two equal sized groups

(the high quality disclosure and the low quality disclo
sure groups) based on the range of the scores between
ninety-six percent and thirty-two percent (detailed re
sults of the evaluation of the annual financial reports
can be found in Chapter 4).

The high quality and low

quality groups provided the basis for evaluating the
effect on systematic risk of differences in the quality
of disclosures.
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STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION CODE SCORING SYSTEM
The evaluation design discussed above is subject to
possible bias in that it reflects the judgment of the
15
author as well as other researchers.
Kochanek
used a
similar design and his results indicated that the design
was capturing significant information on the quality of
segmental disclosures.

Nevertheless, because the design

is judgmental, additional support was sought to prove
that the design would capture significant differences in
the quality of segmental disclosures.

This additional

support was in the form of a comparison of a Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) Code Scoring procedure
with the disclosure scores derived from the evaluation
design.
FASB Statement Number 14 on the segment information
stated that statement users with segmental data can
better appraise a corporation's past performance, future
prospects, and risks than is possible using total enter16
prise data.
Hawkins suggested that in grouping pro
ducts or services to form reportable segments, the

15
Kochanek, op. cit.
16
AICPA Professional Standards, op. cit.
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Standard Industrial Classification system and/or the
Enterprise^Standard Industrial Classification system may
be useful.
If firms reported segments identified, using the SIC
code system, the number of segments reported in the an
nual reports, they should parallel the number of different
industries (SIC code groups) in which the firm operates.
Therefore, if a firm does not report as many segments as
different industries in which it operates, the firm may
be a low quality reporting firm,

If the disclosure

scores and the SIC stores are consistent statistically,
the disclosure score is capturing the information it is
supposed to measure, i.e., differences in disclosure
quality.
The SIC code system defines industries in accord
ance with the composition and structure of the economy
and covers the entire field of economic activities.

The

Executive Office of the President - Office of Management
and Budget lists the general principles in preparing the
classification of industries into different SIC code
groups.

They a r e :

Hawkins, David, F . , Corporate Financial Reporting,
Richard D.Irwin, Incorporated, Homewood, Illinois,
1977, p. 689.
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(1)

the classification must conform to the
existing structure of the American in
dustry;

(2)

each establishment must be classified
according to its primary or dominant
activity; and

(3)

to be recognized as an industry, the
group of establishments consisting the
proposed classification must be sta
tistically significant in the number
of persons employed, the volume of
business done and Other measures of
economic activity.

SIC codes hased on a two-digit, three-digit, and four
digit level have been developing according to the degree
of homogeneity of industrial activity among firms.

The

assignment of an industry code to each establishment is
based on its primary activity, which is determined
by its principal product or group of products, produced
or distributed, or services rendered.

The difference be

tween the four-digit code and the three-digit code or
the two-digit code is the homogeneity of the activity in
the four-digit category.

A four-digit code has greater

homogeneity of activities within the category than the
three-digit code category.

A three-digit code has more

homogeneity of industrial activity than the two-digit
code group.

A two-digit code is the least homogeneous

Executive Office of the President - Office of
Management and Budget, Standard Industrial Classifica
tion Manual, 1972, p. 9.
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primary activity group.

The number of four-digit codes,

three-digit codes and two-digit codes, respectively,
were obtained for each sample firm from the Dun and
Bradstreet One Million Dollar Directory, 1978 Edition
(See Appendix A ) .
The number of the three levels of SIC codes provide
information as to the number of different types of indus
trial activities conducted by each firm.

For instance,

a firm with five four-digit codes which operates in
five industries (according to a four-digit classification
code) may have fewer industries according to a threedigit or a two-digit classification.
A company may use a four-digit code, a three-digit
code or a two-digit code system in subdividing the firm
for purposes of reporting segment information in the
annual reports,

The firm that uses a four-digit code

system in classifying its industries into different
segments, reports more detailed segment information than
the firm that uses three-digits or two-digits to deter
mine segments.
The investigator obtained the number of segments
disclosed by each firm from the 1978 annual reports.
SIC code scores were calculated by dividing the number
of reported segments by the number of the three levels
of SIC codes (a four-digit code, a three-digit code and
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a two-digit code).

For example, if a company has five

four-digit codes, four three-digit codes, and three twodigit codes, respectively, and reports four segments in
the annual reports, the SIC code scores for this firm
are:
(1)

a four-digit code score of 807. (4/5),

(2)

a three-digit code score of 100% (4/4), and

(3)

a two-digit code score of 133% (4/3).

A company that has five industries according to the
four-digit codes, but reports four industries in the an
nual reports, will obtain a lower score than a company
which has four industries according to the four-digit
codes and reports four industries in the annual reports.
Appendix A reports the numbers of the different SIC
code groupings and the scores obtained by dividing the
number of segments by the number of the SIC codes for
each firm for each level (four-digit, three-digit and
two-digit, respectively).

Appendix A also shows the

market beta (systematic risk) for each firm, and the
number of segments reported in the annual reports.
In finding a relationship between the disclosure
scores and each of the SIC code scores presented in
Appendix A, a Spearman Rank Corporation test was con
ducted to examine whether or not the two scores are
statistically correlated.

The procedure for this test

is discussed on the following page.
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Spearman Rank Correlation Test
Spearman Rank Correlation is a measure of the rela
tionship between two or more variables.

The purpose of

this test was to find whether or not disclosure scores
(called Q4) as measured by evaluating the segmental dis
closures in the annual reports is correlated with SIC
code scores for four-digits, three-digits, and two-digits,
respectively.

If the relation between the two sets of

scores are perfect, then the deviation between the two
sets of scores will be zero.

The larger the deviations,

the less perfect will be the correlation between the two
variables.

The deviation was statistically calculated

by finding the difference between the segmental disclosure
score for each firm and its four-digit code score, threedigit code score and two-digit code score, respectively.
The result was squared to remove the negative signs.
T ie deviation which is presented by d^ was computed as
follows:
d± = X i-Yi ........................... (2) , w h e r e ,
= SIC code score for four-digit, three-digit
or two digit SIC codes.
Y^ = Disclosure score obtained from the annual
reports evaluation.
d^ = The difference of the two variables.
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The formula for the Spearman Rank Correlation

19

is

as follows:
N
rs = 1 . 6

£

(3)

n 3-n

The Statistical Analysts System (SAS)

procedure was

used to compute the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients
for each of the three SIC code scores.

The design was as

follows:

SIC CODE SCORES

Disclosure scores ob
tained from the annual
reports evaluation.

Four-digit code scores

Three-digit code scores

Two-digit code scores

19

Seigel, Non-parametric Statistics for the Behavi
oral Sciences, McGraw-Hill Series in Psychology, New York,
Toronto, London, 1956, pp. 127-28.

20

Statistical Analysts System, User1s Manual, North
Carolina, 1971, p. 200.
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ANALYSIS OF THE DISCLOSURE SCORES
Analysis of Variance Procedure ;
The disclosure scores were used to divide the experimental group into the high quality disclosure group
and the low quality disclosure group based on the results
of the annual reports evaluation.

The median disclosure

score was used to divide the experimental sample into
two groups.

The firms with the disclosure scores from

70% to 967, were classified as the high quality disclo
sure group, and those with the disclosure scores from
32% and 69% were classified as the low quality disclosure
group.
Each group was tested for homogeneity of the dis
closure scores,
was applied.

A one-way Analysis of Variance procedure

The one-way ANOVA is based on the realiza

tion that there are two ways to calculate the population
variance from sample data.

Since there are two ways to

estimate the same variance, the value for the F ratio
formed by the two estimates will vary from o n e , by chance
alone, if the data came from one population with a mean
If however, the sample data
came from populations which have different means and a
common variance, the F ratio formed by the two variance
estimates will tend to be greater than one, indicating
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more than one population.

21

The results of this test can

be found in Chapter 4.
Multiple Discriminant Analy^l^
While the sample observations have been divided into
two groups based on disclosure quality, other variables
may affect the systematic risk of firms.

Systematic

risk may be affected by the size of assets, liquidity,
cash-flow, price/earnings ratio, dividend yield, earnings
to net worth, earnings margin, leverage and rate of return.
If this is the case, the sample may suffer from lack of
precision and weaknesses identified in the previous
studies.

To be confident that the sample was homogeneous

and that the influences of extraneous variables did not
bias this investigation, financial variables of the two
groups other than the quality of segmental disclosures
were tested for significance differences.
The purpose of dividing the diversified firms into
two groups according to the quality of segmental dis
closures is to investigate whether high quality firms
have lower systematic risk than the low quality
firms.

Cangelosi, V. E. , Phillip H. Taylor, Philip F.
Rice, Basic Statistics: A Real World Approach, West
Publishing Company, St. P a u l , New York, Los Angeles,
San Francisco, Boston, 1976, p. 165.
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Many factors may contribute to the systematic risk
of the firms.
variables.

Among these factors are various financial

There is considerable evidence that supports

the assertion that financial ratios are related to the
systematic risk of firms.

Previous research has indi

cated the following financial variables affect the sys
tematic risk (Market b e t a ) :
liabilities,
Earnings,

(2) Size,

(1)

(3) Cashflow per share,

(5) Divident yield,

(7) Earnings to Net Worth,
expenditures,

Current Assets/current

(9) Leverage,

(4) Price/

(6) Divident payout,

(8) Earnings to net capital
(10) Earnings margin,
22

(11) Taxes to Net Profit, and (12) Growth in earnings.
These financial variables were taken from the
Value Line Survey Records, 1978 Edition.

The defini

tions of the variables are presented in Table 3.3 on
the next page (See also Appendix B for detailed presen
tation) .

22

Foster, George, o£. cit.
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TABLE 3.3
Definition of Financial Variables
Symbol

Genetic names and definitions

1.

LQ

CA/CL is the current assets divided by current
liabilities.

2.

SZ

Size is measured by the total sales.

3.

CH

Cashflow per share is the Net Cashflow
divided by the common stock at the end
of the year.

4.

PE

Price/Eamings is the price per share divided
by the earnings per share.

5.

DY

Dividend yield is the dividend per share
divided by price per share.

6.

DV

Divident payout is the divident per share
divided by earnings per share.

7.

EN

Earnings to Net Worth is the net earnings
divided by Net Worth.

8.

EC

Earnings to Net Capital Expenditures is the
earnings divided by Net Capital expenditures.

9.

LV

Leverage is total long-term debts divided by
equity.

10.

EM

Earnings margin is the net income divided by
the total investment.

11.

TX

Taxes to net profit is the total amount of
taxes paid divided by net profit,

12.

EG

Growth in earnings is the annual growth rate
in EPS for five years compounded.
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An appropriate statistical approach to examine if two or
more groups are homogenous on multiple variables is the
Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) .

The main objective

of using MDA is to investigate whether the high quality
group and the low quality group are different on the
above financial variables.
MDA was employed to determine and identify which
discriminant (Predictor) variables exhibit significant
differences between the high and the low quality disclosure
groups.

The twelve financial variables discussed above

served as predictor variables (Xj) to calculate a linear
combination of those predictor variables that maximally
differentiated the two groups of firms.

The linear com

bination (Y) was expressed as a function of the predictor
variables (X.) and a set of combining weights

^

n
Y

=

£

(V.) (X.)
J

n

= 1 .....

n

= 1 ......

(V.):

J

75
75

(4)

*3

J = 1,12
Total

150

Discriminant analysis identifies the maximum sepa
ration between groups by forming one or more linear
combinations of discriminating variables.

The discrimi

nant function is presented as follows:

Di = dilZ l + di 2Z2 + ..........

+ dip Zp ....... (5)
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D

is the score on discriminant function i, and d's are
i
weighting coefficients, and the Z's are the standard ■
values of the P discriminating variables used in the
analysis.

The discriminant criterion (/| ) is a function

of the variances between and within groups:
Sums of squares between (b) groups

Sums of squares within (w) groups
Also, this equation can be expressed as the sums of squares
and cross products matrices (SSCP) and the combining
weight matrices (V):
V'SSCP^V
b
(7)
V'SSCP V
w
The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) computer
procedure was employed for this statistical test.

SPSS

performs discriminant analysis either by entering all dis
criminating variables directly into the analysis (DIRECT
METHOD) or through a stepwise method.

This method selects

the best set of discriminating variables.

The criterion

for controlling the stepwise selection in this study was
the minimum "MAHALANOBIS" distance between groups.
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largest minimum F between groups is the largest increase
23
in average multiple correlation.
If the MDA test results indicate that the two
groups are similar based on their financial characteris
tics, the only difference between the two groups is the
quality of disclosures.

However, if the test results

indicate that the two groups are different on the finan
cial variables used in the MDA, financial variables may
play a part in dividing the sample into high quality and
low quality groups.

If this is the case, the associa

tions between the financial variables (that entered the
discriminant function) and the systematic risk (Market
beta) must be investigated so as to know the effect of
these variables on the systematic risk.

If the correla

tion between the financial variables (that entered the
discriminant function) is low, their effect on the sys
tematic risk will be low.

Their ability to separate

the two groups into high quality and low quality groups
will be minimal.
Two statistical approaches were employed to examine
the correlation between the financial variables (used in

^ N i e et. al. , Statistical Package for Social
Sciences, New York, 1975, p. 435.
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the MDA test) and the systematic risk.

The first approach

employed the Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis and
the second approach employed the Spearman Rank Correla
tion.

Both statistical approaches are discussed below.

Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis
In order to be confident that the financial vari
ables that enter the discriminant function of the Multiple
Discriminant Analysis did not pose any problem to the
homogeneity of the two groups; a Stepwise Multiple Re
gression test was conducted.

The betas of the experimental

group were identified as the dependent variables and the
twelve financial variables used in the MDA were identified
as the independent variables.

The purpose of this test

was to enable the investigator to study the linear rela
tionship between a set of independent variables (finan
cial variables) and a dependent variable (systematic risk).
The basic goal of multiple regression is to produce a
linear combination of independent variables which corre
late as highly as possible with the dependent variable.
Spearman Rank Correlation
The Spearman Rank Correlation test was also con
ducted to find the relationship between beta and each of
the twelve financial variables.

Detailed discussion of
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the Sprearman Rank Correlation test can be found on page
52.

The results are presented in Chapter 4.
STATISTICAL TESTS COMPARING THE HIGH QUALITY
DISCLOSURE GROUP, THE LOW QUALITY
DISCLOSURE GROUP, AND THE CONTROL GROUP

Kolmogorov-Smirnov Two-sample Test and Student's t-test
In order to examine the difference between:
(1)

the high quality disclosure group and the
control group,

(2)

the high quality disclosure group and the
low quality disclosure group, and

(.3)

the low quality disclosure group and the
control group, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov twosample test and the t-test were employed
separately for each pair of the three cate
gories mentioned above.

The detailed discussions on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov twosample test and the student's t-test can be found on
pages 39 and 41 respectively.
Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) Procedure
To evaluate the observed beta differences between
the high quality and the low quality groups in a more
formal way, the analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) procedure
was applied.

The variables identified for this test
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were:

(a) the disclosure score as a dependent variable,

(b) the beta weight (risk measure) as an independent vari
able, and (c) quality (High and Low) as an independent
variable.

The beta weight is a continuous variable and,

as such, it is a metric independent variable.

Quality

is a categorical (discrete) variable which is a non
metric factor.

The designs in which metric independent

variables are used in conjunction with non-metric factors
are referred to as analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) design.
The two independent variables were the concern of
the analysis; however, the effect of risk measure (Market
beta) was of primary concern.

Specifically, the ANCOVA

investigated the percentage of explained variance of
the individual independent variables (systematic risk
and quality of disclosure) in the dependent variable (dis
closure scores).

Moreover,

the interaction effect of

both independent variables in the dependent variable was
also determined.

Finally, an F-test was employed for

the statistical significance of the differences.
Summary
In this chapter the research methodology has been
presented.

The next chapter presents the results and

the analyses of the parametric and non-parametric
tests discussed.
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CHAPTER 4
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS
This chapter presents the results of the tests dis
cussed in Chapter Three.

The results are presented in

the order in which the respective tests were conducted.
COMPARISON OF THE EXPERIMENTAL
AND THE CONTROL SAMPLES
The control and the experimental samples were com
pared for significant differences in their systematic
risk.

A non-parametric and parametric tests were

employed (See Chapter 3),
Results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Two-Sample Test
A cumulative frequency distribution for the experi
mental and the control groups, based on ranges of the
market betas were constructed (See Table 4.1).

The

absolute difference between the cumulative frequency
in each cell was calculated.

The largest absolute dif

ference (D) was 23/150 or 0.153.
In testing for the significant difference between
the control and the experimental samples, a two-tail test
at

.05 was calculated.

The critical value of D was

calculated as follows:

64
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TABLE 4.1
Cumulative Frequency Distributions
for Experimental and Control Groups

0.550.86

0.870.97

0.981.18

1.191.39

1.401.60

1.611.80

TOTAL

Experimental
Group

17

30

67

18

15

3

150

Gontrol
Group

40

18

44

25

19

4

150

Experimental
Group

17/150

47/150

114/150

132/150

147/150

150/150

Control
Group

40/150

48/150

102/150

127/150

146/150

150/150

Absolute
Difference

23/150

11/150

12/150

5/150

1/150

0/150

CT\
in

In order to reject the null hypothesis that the two-sample
distributions are different, the absolute differences (d)
must be equal or larger than the critical value of D is:

1.36

V

150 + 150 = 1.36
150 x 150

V

300
22500

= 1.36

y

.013

=

1.36(.115) = .187

The largest absolute difference (d) from Table 4.1 is .153.
Based on the above information, the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected at the .05 significance level.

The results

indicated that both the experimental group and the control
group may have the same beta distributions.

The observed

D indicated that the two samples have not been drawn from
two populations in which one is stochastically larger than
the other.
The Results of Student's t-test for the Experimental
Group and the Control Group
The primary purpose of conducting Student's t-test
was to provide an additional test of the differences
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between systematic risk of the experimental and the control
groups.

The detailed discussion of the Student's test can

be found in Chapter 3.
The results of the t-test are summarized in Table 4.2.

TABLE 4.2
The Control Group versus the Experimental Group

N

MEAN

STD.
DEV.

TVALUE

LEVEL OF
SIGNIFICANCE

Control

150

1.07

.27

-0.60

0.55

Experi
mental

150

1.08

.20

-0.60

0.55

GROUP

Based on the results tabulated above, the mean of the control group is 1.07, while the mean of the experimental
group is 1.08.
(P^

.55).

rejected.

The t-value of each group is -0.60,

The null hypothesis of no difference cannot be
This result indicated that there is no differ

ence between the control group and the experimental group.
However, a further analysis of the t-test statistics indi
cated that the variances of the two groups were statistic
ally different at the 0.001 level of significance.

This

result showed that the dispersion of the systematic risk

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

68
of the two groups were statistically different.

The re

sults suggest that segmental disclosures are significant
to the securities market; however, due to the skewness of
the distributions of the betas of the control group,
this conclusion is not strongly supported.
THE RESULTS OF THE ANNUAL REPORTS EVALUATION
One hundred and fifty 1978 annual financial reports
were evaluated using the evaluation design discussed in
Chapter 3.

The highest score obtained was 96% and the

lowest score was 32%.

Seventy-five of the one hundred

and fifty firms received scores between 96% and 70%,
while the remaining seventy-five received scores between
69%, and 32%.

The median score was 70%.

The median was

used as a basis of classifying the experimental sample
into two groups.

Specifically, the following results

were obtained from the evaluation (See Table 4.3).
Based on these results, the sample was divided into
two groups.

The firms with 70% and above were classified

as the high quality disclosure group.

The firms with 69%

and below were classified as the low quality disclosure
group.

The detailed scores received by each firm can be

found in Appendix A of this study.
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TABLE 4.3
Distribution of disclosure scores
for the experimental sample

Score

Number of Firms

90-96%

1

80-89%

15

70-79%

59

60-69%

28

50-59%

28

40-49%

17

30-39%

2
150
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The Results of The Spearman Rank Correlation
As discussed in Chapter 3 the disclosure scores
were compared statistically with SIC code scores based
on four-digit, three-digit, and two-digit SIC codes.

In

conducting the Spearman Rank Correlation test, the follow
ing variables were used:
(.1)

Q1 = Four-digit code scores

(.2)

Q2 = Three-digit code scores

(.3)

Q3 = Two-digit code scores

(4)

Q4 = Disclosure scores

(.5)

Q5 = Beta weight

(6)

Q6 = Number of segments reportedin the annual
reports.

(Market beta)

Detailed presentation of these variables can be found in
Appendix A.

The correlation between Q4 and Q1 is 45%,

(i.e., r = .45) at the .0001 level of significance.

The

correlation between Q4 and Q2 is 39%. (i.e., r = .39)
at the .0001
tween Q4

level of significance.

and Q3 is 29%,

level of significance.

The correlation be

(i.e., r = .29) at the .0003
The Spearman Rank Correlation

results indicated that the segmental disclosure score
has the highest correlated with four-digit code score.
These results provide some evidence that disclosure scores
obtained by the evaluation of the annual reports based
on FASB Statement Number 14 can provide a measure of
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difference in quality of disclosure.

The Spearman Rank

Correlation test was also conducted to test the correla
tion between Ql, Q2, Q3, Q4 and Q5 (Beta - the systematic
risk).

The purpose of this test was to determine which

of the four disclosure scores had the highest correla
tion with the market beta.

The following results were

obtained:
(.1)

The correlation between Ql and Q5 is -25%,
(P > .001)

(2)

The correlation between Q2 and Q5 is -22%,,
( P > .001)

(.3)

The correlation between Q3 and Q5 is -16%,

( P S .001)
(4)

The correlation between Q4 and Q5 is -54%,,
(P>

.0001)

The segmental disclosure score has the highest correla
tion with beta.

This supports the earlier test, and

indicates that the segmental disclosure score relates
to the systematic risk of the diversified firms.
Based on the above results, the disclosure scores
appear to capture differences in quality of disclosure
and are related to the systematic risk.

Therefore, the

segmental disclosure scores were used to divide the
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sample observations into two groups.

The high quality

disclosure group and the low quality disclosure group
represent the primary samples studied.

COMPARISON OF THE LOW QUALITY DISCLOSURE
AND THE HIGH QUALITY DISCLOSURE GROUPS
The Results of Analysis of Variance Procedure
The Analysis of Variance test (ANOVA) was conducted
to examine whether the disclosure score of the firms in
either the high quality disclosure group or the low
quality disclosure group were relatively the same.

The

results of the test of the high quality disclosure group
are summarized in Table 4.4,

The results of the low

quality disclosure group are summarized in Table 4.5.
The results of the ANOVA test indicated that there
is no difference within the high quality group.

There

fore, the null hypothesis of no difference was not r e 
jected.

This result substantially supports the assump

tion that the high quality group is homogeneous on
disclosure scores.
The results of the ANOVA test also indicated that
there is no difference in disclosure scores within the
low quality group.
was not rejected.

The null hypothesis of no difference
This test also supports the assumption

that the low quality group is relatively homogenous.
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TABLE 4.4
Analysis of Variance for the High Quality Group
Dependent Variable

- Disclosure Group

MS

FVALUE

416

26

0.87

58

1731

29

Corrected
Total

74

2147

Source

DF

SS

Beta

16

416

SOURCE

DF

Model

16

Error

SS

FVALUE

LEVEL
OF
SIGNI
FICANCE

0.87

00.60

LEVEL
OF
SIGNI
FICANCE

0.60
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R2

0.19
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TABLE 4.5
Analysis of Variance for the Low Quality Group
Dependent Variable

-

Disclosure Score

SOURCE

DF

SS

MS

FVALUE

Model

16

1499

93

1.25

Error

58

4334

74

Corrected
Total

74

5834

Source

DF

SS

FVALUE

Beta

16

1499

1.25

LEVEL
OF
SIGNIFICANCE

0.25

LEVEL
OF
SIGNI
FICANCE
0.26
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ANOVA results indicated that the low disclosure quality
and the high quality groups are sufficiently homogeneous
for further testing.
RESULTS OF THE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS TEST
The SPSS Computer Program "DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS"
was used to evaluate the extent that extraneous factors
may have effected the systematic risk of the sample
firms.

SPSS performs discriminant analysis either by en

tering all discriminating variables directly into the
analysis or through a stepwise method selecting the best
set of discriminating variables.

The criterion for con

trolling the stepwise selection in this study is the mini
mum "Mahalanobis" distance between groups.

The "Mahalano-

bis" method seeks to maximize the smallest F ratio between
pairs of groups.
The MDA method indentified four variables with dis
criminatory power:

current assets/current liabilities

(LQ), Dividend yield (DY), Earnings to Net Worth (EN) ,
and Taxes to Net Profit (TX).

The standardized Canonical

Discriminant function coefficients were:

LQ, 0.25738;

DY, -0.67004; EN, -0.30095; and TX, -0.71485.

These

coefficients indicated that the high quality disclosure
group had a lower current ratio, higher dividend yield,
higher earnings to Net Worth and higher taxes to Net
Worth than the low quality disclosure group.
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The results of the MDA procedure are summarized in Tables
4.6 and 4.7 below:
TABLE 4.6
The Results of the Multiple Discriminant Analysis Test

F
TO ENTER
VARIABLE
OR
REMOVE

STEP #

LEVEL
OF
SIGNI
FICANCE

WLLK'S
LAMBDA

1

TX

10.410

.91

.0019

2

DY

8.854

00
00

.0001

3

EN

1.6844

.87

.0002

4

LQ

1.2836

.86

.0003

TABLE 4.7
Classification Function Coefficients

1

2

LQ

5.518

5.862

DY

190.673

164.396

EN

74.771

70.179

TX

5.742

4.526

-18.766

-16.463

Y

Constant
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The canonical correlation of the canonical discriminant
function was 0.37 which indicated 37 percent degree of
separation between the two groups.

Wilks' Lambdas for

the four variables, TX, DY, EN, LQ, were .94, .88, .87,
and .87, respectively.

The larger the Wilks' Lambda, the

less distinct the group.

The Wilks' Lambdas were sta

tistically significant at the .0001 significance level.
2
The minimum Mahaloanobis' D for the variables, TX, DY,
EN, and LQ, were .27, .52, .57, and .51, respectively.
2
The D indicated the distance between the two groups on
2
each variable.
A Chi-square (X ) value of 21.07 at four
degrees of freedom was statistically significant at the
0,0001 significance level.

The result of this test indi

cated that the null hypothesis of no differences between
groups should be rejected,

The differences were measured

by the four discriminating variables.
The overall significance of the discrimination be
tween groups was evaluated by using an F ratio to test
whether the group centroids were equal or unequal.

The

group centroids for the high quality group and the low
quality group were -0.38615 and 0.39658, respectively.
Box's M test was conducted to evaluate the critical value
of F.

The result showed a statistically significant dif

ference in the group centroids at the .0001 significance
level.

The F ratio is 3.01, with 10/105 degrees of
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freedom.
jected.

The null hypothesis of no differences was re
The classification results of the Multiple Dis

criminant Analysis is presented in Table 4.8 below:

TABLE 4.8
MDA CLASSIFICATION RESULTS

Actual
Group

Number of
Firms

1 (high quality)

2 (low quality)

75

75

Predicted
Group
1

2

50

25

(66.7%)

(33.3%)

25
(33.3%)

50
(66.7%)

The major test of a discriminant model is the ability
to classify companies compared to an alternative classi
fication method.

If the error rates arising from the use

of the model are low, the financial ratios in the MDA model
may provide a basis to classify companies for research
purposes.

The error rates in the classification results

presented in Table 4.8 were the same for both groups.
The high quality group (Group 1) had a 33.3% error rate
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as did the low quality group (Group 2).

The overall per

cent of the cases correctly classified was 66.7 percent.
The maximum chance criterion that the discriminant func
tion is a good classifier is 50 percent.

The percent

correctly classified in group one is 66.7 percent.

The

percent correctly classified in group two is also 66.7
percent.

The four variables that separated the two groups

were investigated further,

Taxes to Net Income variable

which was the most powerful discriminating variable was
examined by looking at the extent of industry diversifi
cation between and within the two groups.

The questions

addressed were:
1.

Were the high quality and the low quality groups

well diversified?
2.

Were firms from the same industry in both groups

or did certain industries concentrate in one group?
An examination of these two questions indicated that both
groups were well diversified and that no certain indus
tries were concentrated in either group.

Therefore, there

were no differences between the two groups along either
of the two possibilities mentioned above.
An analysis of the Taxes to Net Income variable
indicated that the high quality group had a higher ratio
of taxes to net income variable than the lower quality
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disclosure group.

This result did not by itself indicate

that taxes to net income variable is a good determinant
of the systematic risk of the firms because one would ex
pect high quality firms with low systematic risk to have
low taxes to net income.

Therefore, the taxes to net

income variable did not pose any problem to the homo
geneity of the two groups.
Statistical Analysis System (SAS) Computer Program
"DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS" with a hold-out sample was also
employed for this test.

Out of the one hundred and fifty

companies, one hundred companies were used (i.e., fifty
companies from each group), to construct the MDA models.
The remaining fifty companies (twenty-five companies in
each group) were held out for the statistical test.

The

purpose of using a hold-out sample was to avoid the up 
ward bias problem in the model.

The results of the SAS

analysis were consistent with the SPSS results reported
above.
The results of the MDA.analysis indicated that the
two groups were statistically different on the four
variables identified above.

These variables would not

allow the corect classification of the firms at a rate
much better than chance.

Therefore, for the firms

studied, extraneous variables which have been shown to
related to beta appeared not to be influential in this
study.
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In order to further examine the relationship between
the financial variables and the systematic risk, a Mul
tiple Regression Analysis was conducted.

The results

are presented in Table 4.9.

TABLE 4.9
The Results of the Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis

Variable Name

Significance Level

Divident yield

0.0001*

Leverage

0.0096*

Earnings Margin

0.1197**

Taxes to Net Income

0.2482**

Cashflow per share

0.1988**

Liquidity

0.2093**

Size

0.1698**

*Significant at .001
**Not Significant at .10
Note that the following variables do not meet the 0.5000
significance level for entry into the regression model:
Price/Earnings, Dividend payout, Earnings to Net Worth,
Earnings to Net Capital Expenditures, and Growth in
Earnings.
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The variables found to be significantly related to
market risk were dividend yield and leverage.

Leverage

was not significantly different among all firms (the ex
perimental sample).

Dividend yield was a significant

variable in the discriminant function.

Therefore, the

financial variables previously shown to be related to
market risk have been controlled with the exception of
dividend yield.

The dividend yield by itself should not

bias the investigation.
A non-parametric Spearman Rank correlation test was
also conducted to determine if the financial variables
affected the systematic risk.

The results were identical

to the multiple regression analysis discussed above.

Fur

thermore, the correlation of systematic risk with disclo
sure quality was more significant than any of the twelve
financial variables (See Table 4.10).
The Spearman Rank Correlation study validates the
Multiple Regression tests reported earlier.

Based on

these results, liquidity did not have statistical signi
ficant correlation with systematic risk of a firm.

Also,

taxes to net earnings did not have any significant sta
tistical relationship with systematic risk.

The dividend

yield by itself should not bias the relationship between
the systematic risk and the quality of disclosure.
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TABLE 4.10
Spearman Rank Correlation Results
Relationship Between Beta (Systematic Risk)
Twelve Financial Variables and Disclosure Quality

Variables

Correlation
' Coefficient

Level of
Significance

1.

Disclosure Quality
(high cr low)

.47

0.001

2.

Liquidity

.06

0.43

3.

Size

-. 13

0.10

4.

Cashflow per share

-.11

0.18

5.

Price Earnings

0.00

0.95

6.

Dividend payout

-0.33

0.0001

7.

Dividend yield

-0.04

0.0001

8.

Earnings to Net Worth

0.12

0.16

9.

Earnings to Capital
Expenditures

0.05

0.54

10.

Leverage

0.11

0.18

11.

Earnings to Margin

-0.06

0.45

12.

Taxes to Net Income

-0.09

0.27

13.

Growth in Earnings

0.04

0.67
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COMPARISON OF SYSTEMATIC RISK AND QUALITY OF DISCLOSURE
The main objective of the study was to examine em
pirically the impact of quality of segmental disclosures
on the securities market.

The main investigation was con

cerned with the experimental group which was divided into
two groups based on the disclosure scores discussed in
Chapter 3.

The first test in comparing the systematic risk

of the high quality and the low quality groups was to ex
amine whether the two-group cumulative distributions were
drawn from the

same population. The

two-sample test was

employed

for

Kolmogorov-Smimov
this test.

The resultof

the cumulative frequency distributions is presented in
Table 4.11.
The largest absolute difference (D) is 35/75 or .4667
(See Table 4.11).

In testing for the significant differ

ence in systematic risk between the high quality and low
quality disclosure groups at the .01 significance level,
equation (8) was used to calculate the critical value of D
as follows:
1.63

1/75
175

+ 75 = 1.63 1/0. 027 =1.63 (0.163) = 0.2657
x 75
V

Based on the above information, the null hypothesis of no
difference was rejected for the high quality and the low
quality disclosure groups at the .0001 significance level.
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TABLE 4.11
Cumulative Frequency Distributions for the High
Quality Disclosure Group and the Low Quality
Disclosure Group

'

BETAS

GROUPS

High Quality
Group
Low Quality
Group
High Quality
Group
Low Quality
Group
Absolute
Difference

0.550.86

0.870.97

0.981.18

1.191.39

1.40
1.60

1.61
1.80

TOTAL

15

26

27

4

2

1

75

2

4

40

14

13

2

75

15/75

41/75

68/75

72/75

74/75

75/75

2/75

6/75

46/75

60/75

73/75

75/751

13/75

35/75

22/75

12/75

1/75

0
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The observed D indicated that the two samples were drawn
from two different populations in which one was stochasti
cally larger than the other.
Thus far, the statistical tests showed the experimen
tal and the control groups' cumulative beta distributions
appeared not to be significantly different, but the high
quality disclosure and the low quality disclosure groups'
cumulative beta distributions appeared to be significantly
different.

However, the cumulative beta distributions of

the high quality disclosure group and the low quality dis
closure group have not been compared with the control
group.

The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test was used for

the comparison.

The cumulative frequency distribution is

presented in Table 4.12 for the Control group and the High
Quality group.
The largest absolute difference (D) is 34/150 or .2267.
In testing for the significant difference between the con
trol sample and the high quality group, equation (8)
used to calculate the critical value of D.

was

The critical

value of D was calculated as follows:
1.36

11150 + 75 = 1.36 y 0 02 = 1.36(0.1414) = 0.1923
150 x 75

Based on the above information, the null hypothesis of no
difference was rejected for the control group and the high
quality disclosure group at the .05 significance level.
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TABLE 4.12
Cumulative Frequency Distributions for The Control Group
and The High Quality Disclosure Group

BETAS

GROUPS

0.550.86

0.870.97

0.981.18

1.191.39

1.141.60

1.61
1.80

TOTAL

Control Group

40

18

44

25

19

4

150

High Quality
Group

15

26

27

4

13

2

75

Control Group

40/150

58/150

High Quality
Group

15/75

Absolute
Difference

10/150

102/150

127/150

146/150

150/150

41/75

68/75

72/75

74/75

75/75

25/150

34/150

17/150

2/150

0
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The observed E indicates that the two samples have been
drawn from two different populations in which one is
stochastically larger than the other.
Finally, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test was
conducted to find the difference in the cumulative beta
distributions between the control group and the low quality
disclosure group.

The cumulative frequency distribution of

the two groups is presented in Table 4.13.
The largest absolute difference (D) is 46/150 or .3067.
Equation (8) was used to calculate the critical value of
(P).

The critical value of D was calculated as follows:

1.63

|/l50 + 75 = 1.63 (.1414) = 0.2305
Kl50' x 75

Based on the above information, the null hypothesis of no
difference was rejected for the control group and the low
quality disclosure group at the .01 significance level.
The observed D indicated that the two groups have been
drawn from two different populations in which one is
stochastically larger than the other.
A Student's t-test was used to cross validate the
non-parametric test results presented above.

The results

of the t-test statistics for the control group versus the
high quality disclosure group, the control group versus
the low quality disclosure group, the high quality disclo
sure group verus the low quality disclosure group are sum
marized in Tables 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16, respectively.
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TABLE 4.13
Cumulative Frequency Distributions for The Control Group
and The Low Quality Disclosure Group

BETA

GROUPS

Control Group
Low Quality
Group
Control Group
Low Quality
Group
Absolute
Difference

0.550.86

0.870.97

0.981.18

1.191.39

1.40
1.60

1.611.80

TOTAL

40

18

44

25

19

4

150

2

4

40

14

13

2

75

40/150

58/150

102/150

127/150

146/150

150/150

2/75

6/75

46/75

60/75

73/74

75/75

36/150

46/150

10/150

7/150

0/150

0

oo
vO
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TABLE 4.14
Control Group Versus High Quality Disclosure Group

GROUP
Control
Experimental

N

MEAN
BETA

STD.
DEV.

TVALUE

PR0B
T

150

1.07

.27

2.42

0.01

75

1.00

.17

2.09

0.03

TABLE 4.15
Control Group Versus Low Quality Disclosure Group

GROUP

Control
Low Quality

N

MEAN
BETA

STD.
DEV.

TVALUE

PR0B
T

150

1.07

.27

3.29

.0001

75

1.17

.19

2.98

.0001

The mean beta of the control group was 1.07, while that of
the high quality disclosure group was 1.00.

The t-value of

2.42 indicated a significant difference in the mean betas
of the two groups.
were different.

Also, the variances of the two groups

Therefore, the null hypothesis of no

difference was rejected indicating that the high quality

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

91
disclosure firms have lower systematic risk than the con
trol sample firms.
TABLE 4.16
High Quality Disclosure Group Versus
Low Quality Disclosure Group

N

MEAN
BETA

STD.
DEV.

TVALUE

LEVEL
OF
SIGNIFI
CANCE

High

75

1.00

.17

5.84

0.0001

Low

75

1.17

.19

5.84

0.0001

GROUP

The next student’s t-test was conducted to compare
the mean betas of the control group with those of the low
quality group.

The results of this test are summarized in

Table 4.15.
The mean beta of the control group was 1.07, and that
of the low quality disclosure group was 1.17.

The t-value

of 3.29 indicated a statistically significant difference in
the mean betas of the two groups at the 0.001 significance
level.

The variances of the two groups were also statistic

ally different at the 0.001 significance level.

Therefore,

the null hypothesis of no difference was rejected.
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results indicated the control group has a lower systematic
risk than the low quality disclosure group.
The final student's t-test was conducted to compare
the high quality disclosure group with the low quality
disclosure group.

The results of this test are summarized

in Table 4.16.
The mean beta of the high quality disclosure group was
1.00; while the mean beta of the low quality disclosure
group was 1.17.

The t-value of 5.84 indicated statistical

ly significant difference at the 0.001 significance level.
Therefore, the null hypothesis of no difference was re
jected.

The results indicated generally the high quality

group has a lower systematic risk than the low quality
group.
RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE HIGH QUALITY DISCLOSURE GROUP VERSUS LOW
QUALITY DISCLOSURE GROUP
The results of the ANCOVA Tests strongly suggest that
the high quality group is significantly different from the
low quality group at the 0.001 significance level.

Speci

fically, the quality of disclosure variable is signifi
cantly different between the high quality disclosure
firms and the low quality disclosure firms, at the 0.05
significance level.

The beta variable is significantly

different at the 0.001 significance level.

The. interaction

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

93
effect of the quality and beta is not significant at the
0.51 significance level.

The test statistic for the

ANCOVA test is presented in Table 4.17.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Line-of Business Reporting Firms Versus
Non-Line-Of-Business Reporting Firms
One of the important issues this investigation has
addressed concerned the capital market reaction to mandated
FASB's Line of Business disclosures.

Mautz and May sug

gested that diversified firms that produce segmental dis
closure information suffer competitive disadvantage as
opposed to the diversified firms or single-product firms
that are not required to provide line-of-business informa
tion in their annual reports.^"
Thus study applied the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample
test and the student's t-statistics to examine whether
there were differences in the beta distributions and the
mean betas of the two samples.

The results of the tests

indicated the two samples are not statistically different.
This finding suggests the line-of-business reporting firms

1
Mautz, R. K. , and May, W. G., "Financial Disclosure
in a Competitive E c o n o m y Financial Executive Research
Foundation, New York, 1978.
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TABLE 4.17
Results of the Analysis of Covariance

MS

FVALUE

LEVEL
OF
SIGNIFI
CANCE

97 .,50

0.0001

FVALUE

LEVEL
OF
SIGNIFI
CANCE

SOURCE

DF

Model

3

15202

5069

Error

146

7583

52

Corrected Total

149

227790

SS

SOURCE

DF

SS

Quality

1

187

3.61

0.05

Beta

1

491

9.47

0.0001

Quality Beta

1

22

0.43

0.51

R2

0.67

MD.

-IS
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may not be significantly different from the non-line-of2
business reporting firms.
A further analysis of the two samples indicated the
variances of the two groups were statistically different
at the 0.001 level of significance.

Therefore, the

equality of the group means did not tell the whole story
about the samples.

The difference in the variances be

tween the two groups relates to the spread or variability
of the data.

The variance measures the extent to which

the values of a set of observations are dispersed.

Since

the variances were different, the two groups were not
homogeneous.

There was a greater dispersion in the con

trol sampe (non-line-of-business reporting firms).

The

smallest beta in the control sample was 0.55 and the
largest beta was 1.80, while the mean was 1.07.

In the

experimental sample (line-of-business reporting firms),
the smallest beta was 0.70 and the largest beta was 1.80,
while the mean was 1.08.

The line-of-business reporting

firms demonstrated lower variance in systematic risk
than the non-line-of-business reporting firms.

The

2
Kang, J. S. , "A Study of Intersegment Allocation
Problems in Segmental Financial Disclosure," Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Texas A & M University, 1977.
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results confirm the findings of Kinney , Collins

and more

importantly, Simonds and Collins^.
In the Foster

6

study entitled "Externalities and

Financial Reporting", he quoted the Wall Street Journal,
29 December, 1978, p. 11 as follows:
"The company maintains that publishing informa
tion required of public companies by the SEC
would put it at a severe competitive disadvan
tage, since the data would be available to its
main competitor, the Dallas Times Herald, which
is owned by Times Mirror Company, Los Angeles.
Belo maintains that because it is significantly
smaller than Times Mirror, financial disclosures
required by the SEC would reveal too much of its
inner workings.
Times Mirror owns several major
papers and can group its newspaper financial
data for reporting purposes.
By contrast, the
Dallas Morning News is the only major newspaper
property of Belo."
(p. 524).
The above quotation is contrary to the efficient
market hypothesis^ which states that all publicly avail
able information is impounded in the security prices.

3
Kinney, oj3. cit.
4
Collins, oj>. cit.
^Simonds and Collins, oj>. c i t .
6
Foster, George, "Externalities and Financial Re- ■
porting," The Journal of Finance, (May, 1980), pp. 521532.
For further study on the Market Efficiency, See
Fama, E. F . , "The Behavior of Stock Market Prices,"
Journal of Business, (January, 1965) .
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The results obtained in this study also refutes the
assumption that the line-of-business reporting firms are
at a competitive disadvantage to their counterparts
which are not required to disclose segmental data.
High Quality Disclosure Firms Versus Non-Line-Of-Busiriess
Reporting Firms'
A further analysis was conducted to examine whether
the control group (non-line-of-business reporting firm)
had lower systematic risk than either the diversified
firms that report high quality disclosures or the low
g

quality disclosures.

These propositions were tested by

using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test and the
student's t-test, respectively.

The first proposition

was that there was no difference between the high quality
disclosure firms and the. control sample.

The results

provided a basis to reject the null hypothesis at the
0.05 level of significance.

Therefore, the two groups

have been drawn from two different populations in which
one is stochastically larger than the other.
A student's t-statistics was also conducted to find
the difference between the mean betas of the two groups.
The results showed that the mean betas of the two groups

8
See Chapter 3 for further discussion on the Charac
teristics of High Quality Disclosure Firms and Low
Quality Disclosure Firms.
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were significantly different at the .016 level of signi
ficance.

The results indicated the high quality disclosure

group generally has lower risk than the control group.
A further analysis on the difference in systematic
risk between the two groups was conducted by investigat
ing the difference in the variances of the two groups.
Again, the null hypothesis that the variances are not
statistically different was rejected at the 0.0001 level
of significance.

The minimum beta for the control group

was 0.55 and the maximum was 1.80, while the minimum beta
for the high quality disclosure group was 0.70 and the
maximum was 1.65.

The standard deviations of the betas

for the control group and the high quality group were
0.27 and 0.17, respectively.

The results of this analysis

indicated again the control group had a higher systematic
risk than the high quality disclosure group.

Investors

appear to be less certain about the segmental data not
disclosed by the non-line-of-business reporting firms.
Low Quality Disclosure Firms Versus Non-Line-Of-Business
Reporting Firms
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test and the student's
t-test were used to test the difference between the
diversified firms that disclose poor segmental data and
the non-line-of-business reporting firms.

The results

of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicated the two samples
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were statistically different.

Therefore, the null hypo

thesis of no difference was rejected at the 0.01 level
of significance.

The results also indicated the two

groups come from two different populations.
A student's t-test was conducted to find whether
there are differences between the two groups.

Again, the

null hypothesis of no difference was rejected at the
0.001 level of significance.

A further analysis on the

variances between the two groups provided the following
results.

The minimum beta for the control group was 0.55

and the maximum was 1.80.

The minimum observation for

the low quality group was 0.80, while the maximum obser
vation was 1.80.

The mean betas of the control group and

the low quality group were 1.07 and 1.17 respectively.
The standard deviations of the control group and the low
quality group were 0,27 and 0.09 respectively.

Based on

the above results, the null hypothesis of no difference in
the variances was rejected at the 0.004 significance level.
The results indicated the control group (non-line-ofbusiness reporting firms) had a lower systematic risk
than the low quality group (firms that report poor qual
ity disclosures).

The results further indicated the

investors may be less certain about the segmental data
reported by the low quality group.

This situation may

arise because the segmental information may not be
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detailed or explicit.

Also, the investors may think that

the low quality disclosure group may be hiding some in
formation to be presented in the segmental data.

These

two situations are possibilities.
High Quality Disclosure Firms Versus Low Quality Disclo
sure Firms
The major part of this investigation is to examine
whether the investors react to the quality of segmental
disclosures.

The results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test

indicated the beta distributions of the two groups were
different at the 0.01 level of significance.
The student's t-test was conducted to examine dif
ferences in systematic risk between the two groups.

The

minimum beta for the high quality group was 0.70, and the
maximum was 1.65.

The minimum beta for the low quality

group was 0.80, and the maximum was 1.80.

The means of

the high quality and the low quality groups were 1.00
and 1.17, respectively.

The standard deviations of the

high quality and the low quality groups were 1.97 and
2.30, respectively.

The results indicated the mean betas

of the two groups are significantly different at the .001
level of significance.

The results also indicated the

high quality disclosure group to have lower systematic
risk than the low quality disclosure group.
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The above results are consistent with the findings of
9
the Kochanek study which reported that:
"Results of the Mann-Whitney U test at the 0.05
level of significance confirmed the a priori
expectation that "good" reporters would exhibit
higher positive Spearman Rank Correlation Coeffi
cients in the intermediate and the long-term
models than "poor" reporters.
The null hypothesis
of no difference is, rs coefficients, between
"good" and "poor" reporters was rejected at the
0.04 level of significance for the intermediate
model, and at the 0.03 significance level for the
long-term model. " (p. 256)
He concluded that his evidence suggests that segmental re
porting aided investors in anticipating future earnings
changes in the present valuation of securities.

10
The present study also confirms Singhvi and Desai
study which concluded that:
Adequate disclosure of information minimized
ignorance in the market and causes the market
price to reflect the true value of the secur
ity; consenquently, the price dispersion is
narrowed down. The dispersion between the
market price and the intrinsic value of a
security in part is the result of the quality
of information - the more superior the quality
of information disclosed, the lower will be
the price dispersion.
(p. 136).
The authors reiterated that one of the reasons why the in
vestors buy securities at a price which is higher than the

^Kochanke, oj>. cit.
"^Singhvi and Desai,

0£.

cit.
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intrinsic value, or sell at the price which is lower than
the intrinsic value is the lack of information which is
necessary to determine the intrinsic value of the security.
Most of these studies have implicitly assumed that "infor
mation content" or "usefulness" can be discerned by ob
serving reactions to specific information items.
Analysis of Covariance:
Quality Group

High Quality Group Versus Low

A further examination on the differences between the
high quality disclosure group and the low quality disclo
sure group was conducted by using Analysis of Covariance
(ANCOVA).

The results suggested that the high quality

group generally has a lower systematic risk than the low
quality group.

The model for this test is significant at

the 0.0001 level of significance.

2

while the R-square (R ) was 0.67.

The F-value was 97.50,
The difference between

the high quality and the low quality groups was signifi
cant at the 0.05 level of significance, and the F-value
was 3.61.

The difference in the systematic risk between

the high quality and the low quality group was significant
at the 0.0001 level of significance and the F-value in this
model was 9.47.
The ANCOVA analysis also provided a basis to test if
the two independent variables, quality of disclosures (a
hon-metric variable) and beta (a metric variable) were

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

103
interactive.

The results indicated there was no inter

action between the two independent variables.

The null

hypothesis of no interaction was not rejected at the 0.51
level of significance.

The F-value was 0.43.

These re

sults indicated the reaction of the securities market to
the quality of segmental disclosure may be independent
of other variables.
The final chapter presents a summary, the conclusions,
the implications, the limitations of the study and the
recommendations for further research.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary
The primary objective of the study was to investigate
the securities market reaction to the quality of segmental
reporting disclosures required by FASB Statement Number 14
in assessing the systematic risk of diversified companies.
The secondary objective was to update the previous studies
which examined the securities market reaction to the SEC
segmental disclosure rules.
The investigation was based on the assumption of the
efficient market hypothesis in the semi-strong form that
the stock prices adjust rapidly and in an unbiased manner
to publicly available information.

The efficient market

research has also indicated that published financial
statements provide data to the market that are recent and
unobtainable from other sources.

Based on the efficient

market hypothesis and its related methodology, a basis
for evaluating the market effects of segmental disclosures
was provided.
To examine the securities market reaction to the seg
mental disclosures, three hundred diversified firms were
selected from the Value Line tape and the Value Line

104
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Investment Survey Records of 1978.

The firms were divided

into two groups:
(1)

firms that reported segmental data as re
quired by FASB Statement Number 14, and

(.2)

diversified firms that did not disclose
segmental data.

The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test and the student's
t-test were employed to determine any differences in the
systematic risk between the two samples.

The results of

the non-parametric test showed that the beta cumulative
distributions of the two samples were not significantly
different.

A student's t-test results indicated no

statistically significant difference in the mean betas of
the two samples.

However, the variances between the two

samples were significantly different at the 0.0001 level
of signficance.
The next step presents the evaluation of the annual
financial reports of the one hundred and fifty diversi
fied firms (the experimental group) that reported segmen
tal information in the annual financial reports.

The pur

pose of this evaluation was to classify the sample into
two groups - high quality disclosure and low quality dis
closure firms.

SIC industry code scores were calculated

for each of the one hundred and fifty firms.

A disclo

sure score was calcualted by dividing the points earned
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by an individual firm by the maximum points available from
the evaluation design.

For example, if a firm obtains a

score of 72 out of the maximum score of 90, the firm ob
tains

an 80% (72/90) score.

The maximum score a firm

could obtain is one hundred percent.

A Spearman Rank Cor

relation test was used to validate the disclosure scores
obtained from the evaluation design of the annual finan
cial reports.

The results indicated statistically signi

ficant correlation between the SIC industry code scores^"
and the disclosure scores at the 0.0001 level of signifi
cance.

The correlations also provide some evidence that

the disclosure scores did measure differences in quality
of disclosure of segment data.
The sample was divided into two groups based on the
disclosure scores.

Seventy percent was the median score

for the one hundred and fifty firms.

The firms that re

ceived scores between 70% and 96% were classified as the
high quality disclosure group.

The firms that received

scores between 69% and 32% were classified as the low
quality disclosure g r o u p .

One-way ANOVA was conducted

to examine the differences within each group based on
the disclosure scores.

The results of the ANOVA test

Four-digit, three-digit,and two-digit SIC code
scores were computed respectively.
Each of these SIC
digit codes was correlated with disclosure scores.
Four
digit code scores had the highest correlation (See Chapter
4).
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indicated differences within groups were not statistically
significant.
Multiple discriminant analysis was used to examine
any differences between the two groups.
variables were examined.
ables.

Twelve financial

They were the independent vari

The dependent variables were the two groups.

The

results of the Multiple Discriminant Analysis indicated
the two groups were not statistically different except
in the following variables:

Current Assets/Current

Liabilities (LQ)» Dividend Yield (DY), Earnings to Net
Worth (EN), and Taxes to Net Profit (.TX) .
To determine which financial variables were signifi
cantly related to the beta, a stepwise Multiple Regression
Analysis was conducted, in which beta was the dependent
variable and the twelve financial variables were the
independent variables.

Only dividend yield was statistic

ally significant at the 0.0001 level of signficance.

A

Spearman Rank Correlation test, was also conducted to find
the relationship between the financial variables used in
the Multiple Discriminant Analysis and the betas of the
two groups.

The results indicated Current Assets/Current

Liabilities (LQ), Earnings to Net Worth (EN), and Taxes
to Net Profit (TX) were not significantly associated with
systematicic risk (beta); however, dividend yield was
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significantly correlated with systematic risk, but this
variable by itself was not a strong discriminating vari
able.
The major investigation of this study was to examine
the differences in systematic risk between:
(1)

the control group (diversified firms that
reported consolidated annual financial reports
only) and the experimental group (diverisified
firms that reported segmental data) ,-

(2)

the control group and the high quality disclo
sure group,

(3)

the control group and the low quality disclosure
group, and

(.4)

the high quality disclosure group and the low
quality disclosure group.

The mean betas of the control group and the experimental
group were not significantly different but the variances
between the two groups were significantly different.

Be

cause of possible contaminating factors, beyond the con
trol of the researcher, attributing this difference only
to non-segmental disclosures is subject to question.

The

Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample tests and the t-tests were
employed to find the differences between each pair of
the groups listed above.

The results of the comparison

of the control group and the high quality disclosure
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group indicated there was a signifies

difference in the

beta cumulative distributions, and that the variances
(dispersion) of the beta distributions were significantly
different for these two groups.
A comparison of the systematic risk of the control
group and the low quality disclosure group indicated that
the mean betas of the two groups were statistically dif
ferent, and that the two groups' variances were statistic
ally different.
Three tests were conducted to compare the high qual
ity disclosure group and the low quality disclosure group.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results indicated that the
beta cumulative distributions of the two groups were
statistically different.

The t-test results indicated

that the two group means were also statistically differ
ent.

The Analysis of Covariance results indicated that

the variances of groups were statistically different.
The high quality and low quality disclosure groups were also statiscally different on the quality of disclosure,

the test of inter

action between systematic risk (a metric variable) and quality
(a non-metric variable) indicated that the two variables
were not interactive.

That is, the interaction effect

between beta and quality was not significant.
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Conclusions and Implications
This study indicates that the quality of disclosure
may be a factor considered in assessing the systematic
risk of diversified firms.

Inadequate financial disclo

sure in the annual financial reports is likely to widen
fluctuations in the security prices since investors are
likely to base their investment decisions, in the absence
of adequate disclosure, on less objective measures.

Conse

quently, the cost of capital to firms may be higher, lead
ing to inefficient allocation of capital resources in
the economy.
Three conclusions are drawn from this investigation:
1.

The findings with regard to the control group

and the experimental group, indicate that these two
samples may have the same group means, but the variances
(dispersions) are different.

As Beaver

has noted, the

results of this study indicate that investors are less
certain about the financial information that is not dis
closed
2.

The findings with regard to the comparison of

the high quality disclosure and the low quality disclosure
groups indicate that the high quality disclosure firms
generally may have lower systematic risk than the low
quality disclosure firms.

These findings support the

assertion of the Financial Accounting Standards Board
^Beaver,

0£.

cit.
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and the Securities and Exchange Commission that adequate
and informative disclosures in the annual financial re
ports and the 10K reports will enable investors to as
sess the systematic risk of firms more accurately.
3.

The findings with regard to the high quality

disclosure group, the low quality disclosure group and
the control group, demonstrate that the high quality
disclosure group has lower systematic risk than either
the control group or the low quality disclosure group.
The low quality disclosure group may be penalized with
higher systematic risk for not disclosing adequate iriformation since the firms in this group are required to pro
vide segmental data.

The test results indicated that the

control group has lower systematic risk than the low
quality disclosure group, but higher systematic risk
than the high quality disclosure group.

The evidence

indicates that the quality of disclosure appears to be
a variable related to systematic risk.

Nevertheless,

where segment disclosures are required, the results
indicate that investors prefer more information to less,
and that such information appears to be informative.
Limitations of the Study
This study was quasi-experimental research.
sample used was not randomly selected.

The

The effect ^of
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randomization is to minimize systematic error in the re
sults of the research being investigated.

The sample of

firms may be situation-specific in the sense that the
firms used are firms with the total assets of $500 inillion
and above.

The generalization of the results to smaller

firms may create some problem.

There may be other vari

ables which interact with the quality of disclosures
that the statistical methods used in this study were u n 
able to detect or eliminate.

No such variables are known

as far as this research is concerned.
Recommendations for Further Research
The importance of segmental disclosures cannot be
over-emphasized in this age of industrial diversification.
Companies attempt to diversify risks of investing in one
product line by investing in multi-product lines.

As

such, empirical investigations are needed on segmental
reporting by the diversified companies.

In the past,

this aspect of reporting was not taken seriously because
many companies were engaged in one or few product lines,
but decentralization has created investment centers and
business segments.

A study is needed to investigate how

communication of the results of operations of these
segments could be improved to aid the financial state
ment users.
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While this research has employed Multiple Discri
minant Analysis, Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test,
t-test and the ANCOVA technique, future research studies
could investigate this problem by using other statistical
tools and other variables which may be useful in com
municating the segmental information to the financial
statement users.

While this study used annual financial

statement information and systematic risk, othe
could use residual analysis.

studies

The effect of disclosures

could be examined by observing the residual returns be
fore and after the FASB's disclosure rule beaame effec
tive.

Finally, while this investigation found that

those firms that have high quality segmental disclosures
have lower systematic risk than either the control group
or the low quality disclosure group, further investigation
is warranted to validate these findings and other previ
ous findings which reported similar results.
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4
Digits

Ratio

3
Digits

Ratio

ACF
Industries

2

250

2

250

2

250

070

095

5

ARA
Services

5

120

5

120

3

200

096

115

6

Airies Stores

4

130

3

166

2

250

041

115

5

Abbott Lab.

6

067

4

100

2

200

070

115

4

Krogger C o .

5

100

5

100

5

100

070

095

5

Black &
Decker

4

100

4

100

4

100

050

130

4

Albertson's
Inc.

4

125

4

125

3

167

076

085

5

Peabody Intl.

5

120

3

200

3

200

070

160

6

Allied
Chemical

6

083

4

125

2

250

056

110

3

American
Stores

5

100

3

167

3

167

078

085

5

AllisChambers

6

050

4

075

1

300

046

130

3

Amerada Hess

4

100

4

100

4

100

070

110

5

American
Airlines

5

080

5

080

5

080

040

140

4

2
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Number of
Digits Ratio
Score
Betas Segments in
____________________________________Annual Report
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2
Disclosure
Number of
Digits Ratio
Score
Betas Segments in
____________________________________Annual Report

American
Brands

6

067

6

066

3

133

080

085

4

American
Can

6

050

5

060

4

075

070

070

3

American
Cyanimid

6

067

5

080

2

200

048

110

4

American
Motors

3

100

1

300

1

300

070

095

3

American
Standard

6

067

6

067

6

067

060

110

4

American
Telephone

3

100

3

100

2

150

070

075

3

Amsted
Industries

6

083

5

100

3

167

074

085

5

Amstrong
Cork

6

067

5

080

5

080

058

100

4

Ashland
Oil

5

100

5

100

4

125

072

090

5

Atlantic
Richfield

3

167

3

167

3

167

078

090

5

Avon Products

2

150

2

150

2

150

058

140

3
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Digits
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3
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Score
Betas Segments in
____________________________________Annual Report

5

060

5

050

3

100

044

125

3

Belco Petro.
Corp.

5

060

5

060

5

060

060

105

3

Bendix Corp.

4

075

4

075

4

075

060

110

3

Bethlehem
Steel

3

100

3

100

3

100

034

150

3

Boeing Company

3

133

2

200

3

300

071

110

4

Boise Cas
cade Corp.

5

100

5

100

2

250

073

140

5

Burroughs
Corp.

5

060

4

075

3

100

045

105

3

Celanese Corp.

6

083

6

083

2

250

072

100

5

Champion
Intl. Corp.

5

060

5

060

2

150

050

110

3

ChesebroughPonds

6

067

5

080

5

080

046

110

4

Chessie
System Inc.

4

075

4

075

4

075

042

085

3

Chicago
Bridge &
Iron

5

080

4

100

4

100

053

095

4

124

Aetna Life &
Cas.
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6

033

5

040

3

067

054

150

2

Chubb Corp.

5

100

5

100

2

250

070

105

5

Cities Service
Co.

6

083

6

083

4

125

070

085

5

Continental
Corp.

5

160

5

160

4

200

076

090

8

Continental
Group Inc.

6

150

5

080

3

133

086

080

4

Continental Oil 6

067

6

067

6

067

066

105

4

Control Data
Corp.

6

067

5

080

5

080

045

165

4

Crane Co.

6

100

5

120

5

120

070

095

6

Crown Cork &
Seal Company,
Inc.

3

067

3

067

2

100

064

100

2

Crum &
Forster

5

060

5

060

2

150

045

110

3

Deere & Co.

3

067

2

100

1

200

058

110

2

200

1

200

1

200

054

130

2

Delta
Airlines Inc.

1

125

Chrysler
Corp.
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Diamond Intl.
Corp.

6

100

6

100

5

120

062

090

6

Diamond Sham
rock Corp.

6

100

5

120

3

200

068

115

6

Digital Equip
ment Corp.

4

075

4

075

3

100

046

130

3

Dow Chemical
Co.

6

050

4

075

1

300

058

150

3

DuPont

4

100

3

133

3

133

062

100

4

Eastern
Airlines Inc.

4

075

4

075

3

100

048

130

3

Eastman Kodak
Co.

6

050

4

075

2

150

062

115

3

Eckerd (Jack)
Corp.

3

067

3

067

3

067

046

140

2

Ethyl Corp.

5

060

5

060

3

100

070

105

3

Evans Prod.
Corp.

5

080

5

080

5

080

050

150

4

Exxon Corp.

6

100

6

100

5

120

086

095

6

Firestone Tire
& Rubber

6

100

5

120

5

120

078

105

6

m

N>

a\

*
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Digit

Ratio

Digit

Ratio

Flintkote
Co.

6

083

2

250

2

250

050

110

5

Ford Motor
Co.

5

040

4

050

3

067

068

105

2

Fruehauf
Corp.

5

040

3

067

1

200

066

100

2

GAF Corp.

6

050

6

050

6

050

065

110

3

Gatx Corp.

6

083

6

083

6

083

050

095

5

General
Dynamics Corp.

6

067

5

080

3

133

058

140

4

General
Motors Corp.

4

100

3

133

2

200

088

105

4

General
Telephone

3

167

3

167

2

250

072

090

5

General Tire
& Rubber

6

067

6

067

4

100

024

100

4

GeorgiaPacific Corp.

3

133

3

133

2

150

055

105

4

Getty Oil Co.

6

100

6

100

6

100

076

085

6

Goodrich (B.F.)

5

060

5

060

3

100

068

110

3
N>
'J
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Digits

Ratio

3
Digits

Ratio

2
Digits

Goodyear Tire
& Rubber

4

100

4

100

3

Gould Inc.

5

080

5

080

4

Grace (W.R.)

5

100

5

100

3

166

071

105

5

Great A & P

6

067

5

080

2

200

48

80

4

Great North
Nekoosa

4

050

4

050

3

067

56

105

2

Gulf Oil

5

080

5

080

5

080

60

90

4

Hammermill
Paper

5

080

4

100

2

200

56

110

4

HewlettPackard C o .

6

067

5

080

3

133

54

120

4

Honeywell Inc.

6

050

5

060

4

075

67

130

3

IC Ind. Inc.

6

100

6

100

6

100

80

100

6

Inland Steel

5

120

3

200

2

300

81

80

6

Intl. Business
Machines

6

067

4

100

4

100

50

100

4

Intl. Harvester

5

100

5

100

2

250

66

100

5

Intl. Paper Co.

6

100

6

100

2

100

54

115

6

Ratio

133

Disclosure
Number of
Score
Beta Segments in
_____________ Annual Reports
072

110

100

4
4

128
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Digits
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Digits

Ratio

J ohns-Manvilie
Corp.

6

067

5

080

4

100

50

110

4

Kaiser Steel
Corp.

6

033

6

033

4

050

62

120

2

KimberlyClark Corp.

5

060

4

075

2

150

68

110

3

Lear Siegler
Inc.

6

083

6

083

4

125

68

120

5

Lilly, Eli &
Co.

6

050

4

075

2

150

62

100

3

Lockheed
Corp.

6

050

4

075

2

150

54

120

3

LouisianaPacific

6

033

5

040

3

067

62

145

2

Lubrizol Corp.

1

200

1

200

1

200

80

95

2

Lykes Corp.

-

-

-

-

Marathon Oil
Co.

3

100

3

100

3

100

74

85

3

Martin Marietta

6

100

6

100

5

120

78

90

6

Masco Corp.

6

120

6

120

5

100

7

4

-

5
129
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Ratio

Digits

Ratio

McDonald1s Corp. 4

075

4

075

3

Mead Corp.

6

067

6

067

3

133

66

105

4

Merck & Co.

6

033

5

040

2

100

68

100

2

Minnesota
Mining & Mfg.

6

067

6

067

5

080

62

110

4

Mobile Corp.

5

100

5

100

4

080

75

95

5

Monsanto Co.

6

100

5

120

1

600

70

115

6

Murphy Oil Corp. 4

125

4

125

4

125

74

125

5

NCR Corp.

4

075

3

100

3

100

48

130

3

National
Gypsum

5

120

5

120

2

200

70

95

6

Natomas Co.

6

100

6

100

6

100

72

105

6

Northrop Corp.

4

125

3

167

3

167

80

90

5

083

6

083

4

125

84

90

5

Olin Corp.

100

" 54

150

3

2

250

2

250

1

500

72

105

5

Owens-Illinois
Inc.

6

050

4

075

3

100

73

90

3

Paccar Inc.

6

050

4

075

4

075

70

115

3

130

Owens-Corning
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Pan Am World
Airways

2

200

2

200

2

200

46

145

4

Pennwalt
Corp.

6

067

6

067

3

133

74

100

4

Pennzoil Co.

5

100

5

100

4

100

72

130

5

Perkin-Elmer
Corp.

5

100

5

100

3

060

62

130

5

Pfizer Inc.

6

100

4

150

2

200

73

120

6

Philips Morris
Inc.

5

100

4

125

4

125

70

110

5

Philip Ind. Inc. 6

050

5

060

4

075

Phillips Petro.

4

125

3

166

3

166

72

115

5

Potlatch Corp.

6

133

5

160

2

400

70

95

8

Raynolds Ind.

5

120

5

120

3

200

76

95

6

Rockwell Intl.

6

083

6

083

3

133

78

75

5

Rohm and Hass

3

200

3

200

1

600

72

110

6

Revlon, Inc.

2

130

2

150

1

300

72

90

3

Safeco Corp.

5

120

5

120

3

200

82

95

6

3

131
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St. Paul Co.
Inc.

3

133

3

133

2

200

52

110

4

Sanders Asso.

3

067

3

067

2

100

48

155

2

ScheringPlough

4

100

4

100

2

200

62

110

4

Seaboard
Coast Line

6

083

6

083

6

083

52

120

5

Shell Oil Co.

6

100

6

100

4

150

88

95

6

Smith Kline
Corp. (Keith)

3

100

3

100

3

Southern Rail
way System

1

400

1

400

1

400

70

90

4

Sperry Rand

6

083

6

083

3

167

72

130

5

Squibb Corp.

5

180

4

100

4

100

70

115

4

Standard Oil
(California)

6

083

6

083

5

100

72

105

5

Standard Oil
(Indiana)

4

100

4

100

4

100

78

90

4

Standard Oil
(Ohio)

5

100

5

100

5

100

80

90

5

100

3

132
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Stauffer Chemical
6
Co.

050

5

060

2

150

60

105

3

Sun Company

4

150

4

150

4

150

80

80

6

Texaco, Inc.

4

125

3

167

3

167

84

90

5

Tiger Intl.
Inc.

6

050

6

050

5

060

70

165

3

Trans World
Airlines

3

100

3

100

3

100

50

180

3

UAL, Inc.

3

100

2

150

2

150

54

155

3

Union Camp Corp. 6

083

5

100

3

167

64

100

5

Uniroyal, Inc.

5

120

5

120

4

150

82

105

6

U.S. Fidelity
& Guaranty

3

167

3

167

1

500

72

85

5

U.S. Gypsum Co.

6

083

5

100

4

125

72

90

5

U.S. Steel Corp. 6

100

5

120

5

120

62

105

6

United
Technologies

6

067

4

100

3

133

70

100

4

Upjohn Company

5

100

4

125

3

166

70

105

5

Vulcan Materials 6

067

4

100

3

133

74

85

4

133

Ratio
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Westvaco Corp.

6

050

5

060

1

300

70

115

3

Weyerhaeuser Co.

4

.125

4

125

2

250

75

110

5

Williamette
Ind.

5

080

4

100

2

200

82

55

4
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APPENDIX B
THE FINANCIAL VARIABLES OF THE HIGH QUALITY
DISCLOSURE GROUP AND THE LOW QUALITY DISCLOSURE
GROUP USED IN THE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
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DIVERSIFIED FIRMS (CONTROL GROUP) THAT DID NOT PIS
CLOSE SEGMENTAL DATA IN THE ANNUAL REPORTS IN 1978
Beta
Adams Drug
Acme-Eleveland Corp.

119
75

Aileen, Inc.

115

Ampex Corporation

115

Alcan Aluminum

90

Alexander and Alexander

95

Allen Group

110

Allergan Pharm.

130

Allright Auto Parks

85

Amalgamated Sugar

60

Amarex, Incorporated
American Bakeries
American Building Maintenance
American Electric

100
95
110
80

American Family Group

119

American Home Products

105

American Heritage Life

70

American Investment Co.

95

American Medical International

150

American Medicorp

145

American Re-insurance

105

American Seating

80

Anheuser-Busch

125

Archer Daniels MID.

115

Arden-Mayfair

80

Aristar, Incorporated

70

Arlen Realty & Development

115

Associated Dry Goods

100

Atlanta Gas Light Co.

75

Atlanta City Electric

80

Auto Train Corporation

100
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Beta
Auto Data Processing

155

Bally Manufacturing Corp.

155

Bancal Tri-State

75

Bandag, Incorporated

135

Bard,

(C.R.)

125

Barry Wright

155

Basic, Incorporated

90

Barwick Corporation

85

Bausch & Lomb

135

Beckman Instruments

135

Baker Industries

115

Berkey Photo

135

Betz Laboratories

125

Benguet Consol. "B"

110

Best Products

150

Block (H. & R.)

145

Blue Bell, Incorporated

125

Bond Industries

100

Boston Edison

70

Big Three Industries

105

Blair, John

100

Braun (C.F.)

135

Brooklyn Union Gas

65

Browning-Ferris Industries

130

Brush Wellman

100

Buffalo Forge Co.

90

Burndy Corporation

85

CTS Corporation

105

Caldor, Incorporated

95

Campbell Red Lake

35

Campbell Taggart

85

Cannon Mills "A"

85

Capital Holding
Cardiac Pacemakers

105
95

Carter-Wallace

115

Carrier Corporation

110
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Beta
Carpenter Technology

100

Carter Hawley Hale

105

Cascade Natural Gas

55

Cenco , Incorporated

100

Central & South West

105

Central Tel. & Utilities
Centronics Data Comp.
Charter N Y Corp.
Chase Manhattan Corp.

75
140
75
110

Chemical New York

85

Chicaga Pneumatic

90

Church's Pried Chicken

155

City Investing Co.

125

Clark Equipment

110

Citizen's Utilities

75

Cleveland Electric

70

Cleveland Trust Corp.

75

Cluett, Peabody

105

Clorox Co.

125

Coldwell Banker & Co.

100

Colonial Stores

75

Columbia Gas System

80

Columbus & South Ohio

75

Commonwealth Edison

80

Commonwealty Co.

90

Comsat

120

Compugraphic Corp.

65

Cone Mills

90

Consolidated National Gas

70

Consolidated Oil & Gas

125

Continental Airlines

150

Continental Illinois Corp.

105

Continental Telephone Corp.

100

Conwood Corp.

135

Cooper-Jarrett, Inc.

95
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145

Beta
Cooper Tire & Rubber

90

Copeland Corp.

95

Copperweld Corp.

85

Cordis
Corroon & Black
Cowless

160
70
100

Credit Thrift Finance, Inc.

90

Crocker National Corp.

90

Crouse-Hinds Co.

100

Cummins Engine Co.

95

Cunningham Drug Store

85

Data General Corp.

180

Dayton Hudson

100

DeKalb Agriculture Research

110

Deltona Corp.

115

Denny's Inc.

165

Dial Corp.

105

Dick (A.B.) Company

100

Dr. Pepper Co.

150

Dorchester Gas Corp.

155

Dunkin Donuts

125

Edison Brothers Stores

80

First Charter Finan.

145

Faberge, Inc.

110

Falcon Seaboard Inc.

115

Finil Santa Barbara

150

Fisher Scientific

130

Fleetwood Enterprise

175

Franklin Mint

130

Friendly Ice Cream

120

Gateway Industries

100

Golden West Finan.

140

Gorden Jewelry

120

Government Employees Ins.

100

Gray Drug

70
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Beta
Hawaiian Electric

70

Hilton Hotels

140

Holiday Inns Inc.

160

Household Finance

125

IPCO Hospital Supply

145

King's Department Store

115

May Dept. Stores

115

Michigan Gas Utilities
Ohio Casualty Corp.

70
100

Ohio Edison

70

Pacific Lighting

60

South California Edison

80
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